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GARY EICHTEN: Of course, President Clinton, as you well know, is in Europe this week. This is his first visit to Europe since becoming president. Mr. Clinton is in Brussels for a meeting of NATO leaders. Later this week, he flies to Prague to meet with East European leaders. And then it's on to Moscow for a meeting with Russian president Boris Yeltsin.

The meetings could have a long-lasting impact on US-European-Russian relations. And joining us today to discuss some of those issues is Nick Hayes, an expert on Russia who teaches history at Hamline University in Saint Paul. Nick, thanks for coming by today.

NICK HAYES: Oh, I always enjoy it, Gary.

GARY EICHTEN: Nick, by the way, is returning to Russia later this week, and so we'll be checking with him at the end of this week to assess Clinton's visit to Moscow. Also, we should note that right now, we're planning on Friday here on Midday to broadcast the president's TV appearance in Moscow. He's supposed to be speaking to the Russian people and I think taking questions directly from the Russian people as well. And then we'll be talking with Nick Hayes, so-- anyway, a full week of coverage here on Midday.

The president has a full agenda, no question about it this week. What do you see as maybe the most critical part of this trip?

NICK HAYES: Well, there's really, I think, three pressing areas that have to be on the agenda for the trip to be successful, Gary. Number one, he has to send a clear message that the United States remains committed to the security interests of Europe.

That is, that the United States is engaged in European affairs, security affairs, and that we haven't just somehow walked away. The problem, if I may clarify that for the last year and a half, is frankly, the Clinton administration's message to Europe has been pretty mixed. It's as if it has not been a major priority that it was for previous administrations, and as if, of course, Clinton would like to jump into the 21st century in the new age of the Pacific century and walk away from the age of the Atlantic century.

The second message is, and this can't be avoided, everybody knows that the issue is the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. That is, if they do not find some way of addressing that issue, it's once again just the politics of diplomatic denial. Some response has to be defined in terms of how they'll approach that.

And of course, the third issue is, what is to be the relationship now of the two halves of Europe? Frankly, that is, what is to be the relationship between former Communist Europe and the Western democracies? So far, frankly, he appears to be falling a bit flat on that. I think this proposed partnership for peace, I mean, it sounds nice.

This is a diplomatic initiative designed for politicians, designed for poll takers. Frankly, it's not one really designed for military strategists. It's not one really designed for diplomats.

GARY EICHTEN: Do you see that more as a fig leaf than anything else?

NICK HAYES: Yes, I'm afraid so. It clearly does not send-- it's neither fish nor fowl. It doesn't send the security message to the former East European countries that's needed. And what's more, it doesn't really provide a definition of the future alliance arrangements for Europe.

GARY EICHTEN: If instead of approving the Partnership for Peace plan today, the NATO leaders had said, well, no, I think what we're going to do is have-- if you want to be part of NATO, you being Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so on and so forth, Lithuania, come on in. Would the Russians have been justified in becoming fairly instantly paranoid about this?

NICK HAYES: Yes, the Russians would, of course. I mean, that's the essential flaw. And we have to step back and reflect-- I mean, what was NATO for? I mean, perhaps we can argue forever what NATO did, what it intended to do, but it did clearly three-- it had three objectives. It was to be an alliance to deter potential Soviet aggression and expansion into Europe. It was a vehicle for unifying Western Europe. And finally, it was a vehicle for American leadership.

Well, the real question is, that isn't the security agenda anymore in Europe. Therefore, what future is there for NATO? What is necessary at this stage is, frankly, the reconvening of a major diplomatic conference of some kind to define some new form of an international security mechanism that could grow out of NATO, a means for resolving disputes, for hearing disputes, and at the same time, some other kind of alliance system.

If I can put on my historian's hat just here for a moment, Gary, the best analogy is to go back to the 19th century after the wars of Napoleon and the French Revolution, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. And that created a framework for discussing European disputes as a whole, but it also created a basic alliance of the key players, Britain, France, Prussia, what became the future German state, Austria and Russia.

Simply put, history tells us, if Russia is not part of a European alliance system, Europe divides into two parts and it becomes inherently unstable.

GARY EICHTEN: Clinton said today, though, that the Russians are welcome to become a partner for peace.

NICK HAYES: Well, I mean, again, the problem with this is, that's all nice. I mean, sure, they're welcome to become partners for peace. But the question is, partners for security. Alliances are meant to be a means of providing military security. So what does this mean, a partner for peace?

Let's imagine, here's what's really on the agenda, and of course, this explains NATO's hesitation. One can imagine, we could sit here and probably list a hundred possible border disputes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if we cared to. At any point in time, there could be a conflict between Russia and Estonia, between Russia and Lithuania, between Germany and Poland. Who knows? You could continue them forever to look at it.

But the problem for Western Europe is, if they grant a security agreement to the former Soviet Union, does it mean that let us say, the NATO countries get embroiled in these disputes, say, between the Ukraine and Russia? But simply offering a partnership for peace, it's simply too vague. It doesn't give anyone a sense in a real, concrete manner how military disputes will either be preempted or resolved.

GARY EICHTEN: Last question before we get to our callers. The president announced today that Ukraine, Russia and the United States have reached an agreement whereby Ukraine will get rid of all of its nuclear weapons. Is this a significant breakthrough?

NICK HAYES: Well, this is-- and if I sound too critical of the president, let me step back a second. I think they played this diplomatic card beautifully. Washington sent a clear signal to the Kyiv government over the last few months that if it did not cooperate on this issue, of these weapons, it was going to get a pretty cold message out of Washington.

Clinton delivered a diplomatic snub to Leonid Kravchuk, the president of Ukraine, by refusing to go to Kyiv separately. He told him, you can come to Moscow and meet the second fiddle to Yeltsin, if you want. And this apparently escalated the pressure on Ukraine to reach some sort of an agreement, which, as we gather, has been made now.

And frankly, that was the sine qua non, that was an absolute requirement for the improvement of diplomatic relations and really a more open policy by Washington towards Kyiv. I think it's been handled very well.

GARY EICHTEN: Our guest today is Nick Hayes, who is a long-time expert on events in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the rest. He teaches history at Hamline University. As a matter of fact, he'll be heading back to Russia again on another visit in the middle of this week. Let's go to our first caller with a question for Nick Hayes. Hi.

SPEAKER 1: Yes, what is Russia's position on the war in Bosnia, and what impact does that have on any possible action that NATO or the EC or the US takes in Bosnia? And then my second question would be Zhirinovsky realized that bad publicity is better than no publicity. I'm wondering if in the months since the election, whether the bad publicity is beginning to hurt him, or is he getting more popularity because of it? Thank you. |

GARY EICHTEN: Thanks for your questions. First of all, Russia's position in Bosnia.

NICK HAYES: All right. Both are very good questions and to the heart of issues of Russian domestic and foreign politics today. On Bosnia, Russia really speaks with two mouths. Russia officially abides by the UN positions in regard to the former Yugoslavia, and unofficially, without a question, supports the Serbian position.

In point of fact, this is one of the pressures on Yeltsin virtually from Zhirinovsky, even into the moderate nationalist sentiments of Russian opinion. The Serbs are viewed as Russia's long-time traditional little brother of Southeastern Europe. The Russians have been, frankly, providing clandestine arms support since 1991, 1992 to the area.

And in point of fact, Russian soldiers have been present in Bosnia, they're helping, assisting, in various military formations, providing guard and security services. There's daily Aeroflot cargo planes that arrive in the Belgrade Airport and so forth.

And to make an important point in bringing a resolution to the crisis, there will not be a resolution to the crisis in Bosnia until there is an agreement among the key great powers to work together on it. There will have to be some kind of reconvene Geneva Convention, perhaps. And in determining the outcome of that convention, Russia will have to be a part, together with the United States, France, Britain and Germany.

As for Zhirinovsky, this is a phenomenal story that's part comic, part tragedy. I did have, I guess I could call it the privilege. I have seen him at a few rallies. I've never had the distinction of meeting the man. But in the summer of 1991, I followed him around a bit when he was campaigning against Yeltsin. At that time, by the way, I forget exactly what-- he took 46% of the vote.

One thing I should note about him, he appears like a clown, but he's a very, very bright man. He's well-educated. One has a sense that he knows exactly what he's doing with the media. And right now, to answer the listener's comment, he knows he thrives on the bad publicity, but he has endless room to gain it.

He's playing for PR points, not here in Minnesota, not in Washington, not in Europe, but he's playing for them in Irkutsk. He's playing for them in the Russian hinterlands, and he scores a point at virtually any time he wants. You see, the simple fact is that there is a whole range of painful, sensitive issues out there. There's an increased anti-Western, anti-American sentiment, and Zhirinovsky can pick two or three issues a day if he wants.

And he sails off, like, let us say, the Rush Limbaugh of Russian politics, and his popularity rises. In point of fact, he declared that Clinton had snubbed him last week by not agreeing to meet with him. Zhirinovsky's popularity went up a few points. What's more? Russian TV has caught on to the game. He's a good copy. That's, in part, why they put him on. He's amusing. He's funny.

When he actually gets on the air, he talks about everything from vodka and sex to what he thinks about Clinton and anything else. So he just comes off as frightening but somewhat amusing and frankly, engaging figure, and more and more people watch and follow him.

GARY EICHTEN: Now, he apparently told CBS today that he is the victim of poor coverage, of media manipulation. He says he is a democrat, that he is not an anti-Semite and is a democrat, I believe is what he said, and has no interest in taking over the world or whatever. Is he a democrat?

NICK HAYES: Well, he's a democrat in the way he defines it. That is, in his case, I guess he believes "Vox populi, vox Dei," "The voice of the people is the voice of God." That is, he has a popular base, he knows that. He's an elected person, that's what he means by being a democrat.

He's a democrat in the sense of popularity, not in the sense of respect for the democratic process. Is he an anti-Semite? Well, this is an issue that is very difficult to describe. He is the most politically incorrect politician I've heard of in a decade or two.

He is openly racist. Two years ago on the MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour, he tried to persuade the American public that we should see Russia as historically defending the white race against all of these various mixed and colored races that would have threatened the West.

He is anti-Turkic, by the way. That's one of his great passions. He happens to be a Turkic language specialist by training. He hates the Turks, the Turkic minorities. This tends to be much more a passionate issue of his politics than anything else. His father is Jewish. For what it's worth, he apparently applied for an emigration visa to Israel in 1981.

Is he anti-Semitic? Yes, I've heard him make anti-Semitic remarks. He makes classic statements, like the Jewish Zionist control all the media, the Jewish Zionists, I've heard him declare, were funding money to undermine holy Russia and so forth. He is anti-Semitic, but it's only one of his many, many racial overtones.

GARY EICHTEN: Is he evil in the same sense that Adolf Hitler was an evil person? He's often likened to Hitler or at least his policies.

NICK HAYES: Well, I never like to get engaged in moral algebra here, Gary. I mean, it's like, was Hitler worse than Mussolini and so forth? He's definitely an evil politician. Is he worse than Hitler? I don't know. The problem is, you have to get all the way to Hitler before you discover a man is evil.

This is a man that clearly would incite violence, that clearly would act in a violent manner towards non-Russian elements or people that oppose him. That would be a clear threat to the stability of the countries and neighbors around Russia. Is he a Hitler? No. I mean, Hitler was a bit of a clown, but frankly, I don't know.

By comparison, Zhirinovsky looks like Bozo the Clown. I mean, he does come off as an incredibly comic figure. I remind our listeners, I think I've mentioned it here on the station before, he got into politics in 1991, campaigning that vodka prices should be rolled back to the 1985 price levels and be available to Russian men 24 hours a day. He started with these silly campaigns.

The real danger of Zhirinovsky is that others sanitize his issues. They become more respectable. He has moved the whole spectrum of Russian politics from Yeltsin to the center, further towards the right. And he sets the stage, not so much for himself, but frankly, for a more charismatic, a more intelligent Russian dictatorial figure to come, perhaps in the 1996 election.

GARY EICHTEN: Back to the phones and other callers on the line with a question for Nick Hayes. Hi.

SPEAKER 2: Hi, I've got a more historical economic policy question. To it, I've been reading Dave Remnick's Lenin's Tomb.

NICK HAYES: It's a very good book.

SPEAKER 2: Yeah, and in that, he just he doesn't spend much time on it, but he briefly mentions that while the Soviet economy had been crumbling for decades, what really cut it off was the decline in oil prices because they'd been making a lot of money exporting oil.

And this happened about the same time that Gorbachev got on, and it forced him to institute perestroika. Now, if that's true, it sounds as though the real nostalgia for the good old days is for low oil-- or rather high oil prices and lots of oil money rather than for collectivist policies. And the problem now isn't the capitalist chaos and corruption, it's more just this export. Do you have any comment on that?

NICK HAYES: Well, the book you referred to is by David Remnick called Lenin's Tomb, and it really is a brilliant analysis of the fall of the Gorbachev years. I would hesitate, though, on the judgment, there were a series of things. The critical breakdown of the economy began in 1975, and it was due to a series of agricultural problems that had a ripple effect through the economy as a whole.

The problem of petroleum production is true that what happened in the 1980s-- well, this has been going on since 1973, that basically, rising petroleum prices were able to cover a whole series of economic problems in the Soviet Union. And then what happened is their sources were drying up, it was requiring more and more capital to get less and less petroleum out, and of course, the drop in petroleum prices.

But all of that just means it underscores a simple point. That basically, despite everything else the Soviet Union had done, despite its great power status, it really had the relationship to the industrial West and say, to Japan, of a third world country. It was basically like the Middle East riding on increased revenues from natural resources. And in that kind of game, you can never economically win.

Now, in terms of what Gorbachev recognized, he did recognize that they somehow had to develop a more competitive technological economic infrastructure, and that was the path he tried to turn the country towards, and that's the path they continue today. But to be entirely honest, the situation today is, in a way, the worst of both worlds. You've seen the complete dismantling of the old communist economy, but no real economic mechanism has come in its place.

You do not have so much a free market force as you have every black marketeer, every huckster, every profiteer, every corrupt politician trying to make a buck. Simply put, there is not the managerial vision. There's not the economic leadership from either the state or the private sector that has been able to move towards a new economic structure.

GARY EICHTEN: Have any of the former Soviet republics, or for that matter, any of the Eastern European countries that were controlled by the Soviet Union, have any of them made the conversion--

NICK HAYES: Oh, sure.

GARY EICHTEN: --from communism to capitalism without this wrenching--

NICK HAYES: Well, it's been painful for everyone, but for some, the turnover has been relatively quick. In terms of the former Soviet Union, Estonia is doing very well. Estonia has emerged and in effect is the Hong Kong that services the former Soviet empire.

In terms of the other East European countries, Hungary made the quickest transition and is clearly doing the best. Incidentally, it seems to be the closest for getting membership in NATO. That can't be by coincidence. The Czech Republic is second. Poland remains slightly on the edge, but for the most part, Poland has economically done better than the way we perceive it in the West.

It appears to be still suffering its wounds from the transition. And it's taken a step or two back in the last few months due to the return of former Communists into the political leadership, but for the most part, it appears to have turned the corner. On the other hand, there are certain areas.

Slovakia, for example, remains a basket case. Romania, the same thing. Bulgaria, almost the same type of conditions. There you have countries that frankly seem to be 20 to 30 years before we can anticipate any kind of significant change. And in part, the problem is the same as Russia. They really have not engaged in the economic reforms necessary to make a transition.

GARY EICHTEN: Back to the phones and other callers on the line with a question. Hi.

SPEAKER 3: Yeah, hello, sir. I'm Ukrainian citizen and--

NICK HAYES: Yes.

CALLER 3: I have a question, this, why America is trying to push Ukrainian government for a long time to move all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil to Russian soil? And my real question is, does America trust more Russia than Ukraine? And we see, for a long time, probably for all Russian history, how unstable is Russian politics, even under Yeltsin or Gorbachev presidencies. Thank you.

GARY EICHTEN: Thanks for your call.

NICK HAYES: It's a very good question, but it's slightly misleading. We're actually not pushing Ukraine to give the weapons to Moscow. We're pushing Ukraine to carry out the INF and the start agreements to see that the weapons are destroyed. That's the point. We want the weapons destroyed.

And then the second point is, we want the non-proliferation treaty to be observed so that the nuclear club does not expand. Again, this isn't a question so much of trust of Russia in general, it's a question of how to execute a diplomatic agreement that was made before.

GARY EICHTEN: Why can we not allow Ukraine to keep its weapons as we're allowing Russia to keep its weapons?

NICK HAYES: Well, because we have diplomatically accepted the argument that Russia is the heir to the Soviet Union. And that was part of the initial agreement, so Russia is regarded as the heir to the diplomatic agreements, organizational memberships, and so forth of the former Soviet Union that was part of INF and START. And therefore, Russia is allowed to keep the weapons as Moscow had originally signed.

GARY EICHTEN: People in Ukraine, are they a little wary about this? Because after all, if you've got nuclear weapons, it's far less likely you're going to be attacked by anybody. Ultimately, are they a little skeptical about sending their weapons off to Russia or to just to be destroyed--

NICK HAYES: Well, certainly.

GARY EICHTEN: --and they'd get blackmailed by Yeltsin?

NICK HAYES: Certainly, they would be apprehensive about sending them off to Russia. But there's basically a series of technical problems with it. I think if you were to sit down and talk to Leonid Kravchuk, or if you were to sit down and talk to members of the Rukh, the Ukrainian National Movement, you would probably find that most know exactly what they're doing.

They're playing the nuclear card here as a bargaining chip in terms of economic aid, in terms of putting pressure to get some kind of security back up, both from Moscow and from outside sources, to prevent further Russian intimidation of Ukraine.

By the way, this is exactly what they did on the Black Sea. There was a controversy between Moscow and Kyiv over who controlled the Black Sea fleet. And basically, Kravchuk held out till last summer and in effect, used it for economic aid. He basically sold the Black Sea fleet back to Russia. And in effect, they're doing the same thing with this item.

Again, the technical problems are this, number one, to the best of our intelligence analysis, only Moscow can control those weapons, anyway. Number two, as President Clinton mentioned today, they're targeted, they're directed at us. I mean, they don't have an effective military use against Russia. Simply, they can be used as blackmail. I mean, if somebody can reprocess the nuclear materials, perhaps, but that does not seem to be the case in terms of how they're set up at present.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's go back to the phones and other callers on the line with a question for Nick Hayes. Hi.

SPEAKER 4: Yes, I'm calling from Houghton, Michigan. And I wonder, we have no means of storing or disposing of high-level nuclear wastes or materials of any kind. Now, when we dismantle all of these nuclear weapons, both in the United States and in Russia and in Ukraine and whatever, what on Earth are we going to do with all of this newly-generated, high-level nuclear waste? It's mind-boggling.

NICK HAYES: Well, unfortunately, I'm not a physicist, so I can't correctly answer your question. I can tell you, for example, in the current plan, as it was-- I do not know if this was in the agreement today, but as it was proposed over the last week, ultimately, Ukraine is to be paid up to, I believe, $12 billion for, in effect, the purchase of the enriched uranium, which is to be reprocessed to other uses. And frankly, I do not know what those other uses would be.

GARY EICHTEN: We would pay the money, or who pays? Because Russia doesn't have any money, do they?

NICK HAYES: No, no, no. We would pay the money together with IMF.

GARY EICHTEN: OK. Back to the phones. Another caller is on the line with a question for Nick Hayes. Hi.

SPEAKER 5: Hi. I'm calling from Saint James.

GARY EICHTEN: Yes, sir.

SPEAKER 5: I was interested in how-- excuse me, let me rephrase that. I'm interested in factionalism in modern Russia on the street level. I think it's true of any country that the great driving political force is the mutual dislike the citizens have for each other. And I was curious to know how dislike is dispensed and distributed amongst the little people in Russia.

Also, how excited could the average Russian citizen get about being given a gun, being put on a train, and being shipped off to Siberia to be put on a boat and be shipped off to Alaska to duke it out for Alaska?

NICK HAYES: Well, I think I could answer the second question first. I don't think the average Russian is too excited to engage in Zhirinovsky's much-vaunted statement about regaining Alaska.

GARY EICHTEN: Now, is he serious? Again, this CBS interview, he said, well, actually, I didn't mean that we were going to take over Alaska. Although, he said there's some evidence that we just leased it to the US and so we would have to retake it in that instance. Is he serious about this stuff?

NICK HAYES: Well, first of all, Alexander Solzhenitsyn once said more or less the same thing, all right. So you don't have to go to the extreme lunatic right in Russian opinion to find people who say, we never should have sold Alaska. It was illegal. It was meant to be a temporary arrangement and so forth.

This has been a myth of the Russian right now for about 20, 30 years, about the sale of Alaska. But what's behind Alaska? I mean, why is Zhirinovsky raising the issue? Because his politics lie in the reassertion that they will go back to the claims and power of the Russian Empire that preceded the Soviet Union.

And let us remember, the Russian Empire was far vaster than what the Soviet Union became. The Russian Empire included Poland. It included Finland. And frankly, for a period of time, it included Alaska. It included Fort Ross, north of San Francisco. In 1820, it included a part of Hawaii. And it's not that he's going to extend--

GARY EICHTEN: That was all part of Russia?

NICK HAYES: Alexander I sent a naval expedition to Hawaii in 1820. These things get a little ludicrous here, but of course, 19th century was the age of imperial expansion, and the Russians had penetrated Alaska in the 18th century and settled certain points of it.

Now, of course, nobody means this seriously, and nobody takes it seriously. But at least it establishes the idea that Moscow is once again the heir of the Russian Empire, and it has vested interests in certain areas. And it's much more of a message, for example, to Poland, to the Baltic countries, to Finland, than it is to us, and I don't think we really need to fear about Alaska.

GARY EICHTEN: Do the Poles, for example, do they have a legitimate concern that Russian troops will one day soon be trying to reoccupy Poland?

NICK HAYES: Well, of course, they do because historically, we have to think of things in the long historical context. That is, this has been a pattern, a recurring pattern since the late 18th century. So, yes, Poland can never forget this.

The second issue is that at any given time, Moscow-- in fact, it did this, Gary, in the Soviet period. At any given time, it could say, you know, in 1945, we really were not entirely fair in how we established the borders of Poland. After all, what is Western Poland is historically Prussia. What is Eastern Poland is historically-- excuse me, what is Western Russia towards Belarus was part of a border that was pushed westward by Stalin at the conclusion of the war.

They could raise the issue of, isn't it not time to rethink the Lithuanian boundaries? There's this funny little piece of territory up there, that's part of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad. That's historically East Prussia, this little teeny patch of territory between Lithuania and Poland.

And this is the issue that Poles perhaps fear most, that the Russians could simply raise the issue that it's really time to reconsider Poland's boundaries. And frankly, German nationalists feel exactly the same. And suddenly, you could find much more pressure on Poland.

GARY EICHTEN: Is this why at least some people in NATO are so hesitant about bringing in some of the other East European states, or we're going to end up going to war over there?

NICK HAYES: It brings us back to what we tried to describe before, that West European countries could be involved in regional and border disputes that are interminable. First of all, Gary, frankly, NATO already has a very bad experience. That is, we have the issue of our two allies, Turkey and Greece, engaged in a conflict over Cyprus. That's one precedent.

When we expanded the alliance into the Balkans to connect Greece and Turkey, we began extending into these kind of conflicts. Now, fortunately, that situation seems to be somewhat stabilized. But if you expand it into Southeastern Europe, if you expand it into the Baltic countries, right away, you have the threat of these kind of conflicts.

If we were to extend it to the former Soviet republics, what would we do? Right now, we have a civil war in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. We have a virtual one between the Russian minority and the country known as Maldova, the former Moldavian Republic, that's ethnically close to Romania, Central Asia. I mean, you can just proliferate these nightmares immediately.

GARY EICHTEN: Our guest today is Nick Hayes, who teaches history at Hamline University in Saint Paul and who was one of the area's best known and best informed experts on issues in Russia, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe. If you've got a question, you'd like to join the conversation, of course, we're focused today on this subject because President Clinton is over in Europe, his first trip to Europe.

And soon, on Wednesday, he's off to Moscow to meet with Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Later in the week, he'll be talking on Russian TV to the Russian people. And so we thought we'd spend some time today looking ahead at some of the key issues facing the president on his trip. Let's go back to the phones and other callers on the line. Hi.

SPEAKER 6: Hi.

GARY EICHTEN: Yes, go ahead sir.

SPEAKER 6: My question is in the form of a historical experiences of the past. And the first concern I have is what President Theodore Roosevelt once said about the Russians. He said that they were very insincere and treacherous people who could not be trusted, and therefore, it was not in the best interest of America to really do the kind of business with them. I think America equally became frustrated when the Tsar succeeded in uniting with England and France against Germany.

And I also want to note that the desire of the Western Allies to frustrate the Soviet Union by creating Poland and Romania and the Czech and Yugoslavia seemed to create the thought in the minds of all of those people in that region that they really don't know what is being done with them, and they feel that they are being betrayed.

And then I have a strong feeling, and I'm saying these things because I am from Africa, and I see less of the Clinton policy going towards anything in Africa and other part of the world, except for the former Soviet Union and Israel and the Palestinians.

But my concern is that Joseph Stalin came in and many people thought he was a good guy to do business with, and American businessmen call on Franklin Roosevelt to open up trade links with Russia and recognize Russia and do business with Russia. Again, Russia fails the Americans. We saw that Great Britain itself decided to do business in 1921 with the Russians. Germany decided to do business in 1922 with the Russians.

These are the same people at the conference. These are the same people talking. These are the same people giving us hope. And I am concerned because President Clinton is actually, as president of the United States, the most powerful man in the world.

And until he learns from somebody like President Kennedy, who I talked with last night through some of his writings, and become both concerned about the rest of the world as well as about the domestic policy in the United States, he may well encounter some problems.

You think that going to Russia, you think the Russians really trust President Clinton? You think the people of the former Soviet Bloc and of Eastern Europe really trust Clinton? Do you think even the Europeans themselves really trust the Americans?

GARY EICHTEN: OK, Nick?

NICK HAYES: Well, there's many things that our caller touched upon, and first of all, reference, it is true that Teddy Roosevelt called the Russians, I believe, inveterate liars. But nevertheless, it should be pointed out that old TR did negotiate the conclusion to the Russo-Japanese war in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the Portsmouth Treaty, one of the more successful diplomatic treaties regarding in Russian history.

And the second thing is it's just too simple, that is, reality, and let's keep this in perspective. Russia has been a great power for at least 300 years. These are not good ears for Russia now, but it will be back. We cannot engage in, let us say, the fantasy that Europe engaged after World War I when Germany was defeated, and simply wish its power away.

And now that Russia has crumbled, its humiliated, its obviously vulnerable, weak at the conclusion, the humiliating end of the Cold War for Moscow, we must also remember that European and global stability depends on a role with Russia. You can't escape that problem.

The final point, I guess, does touch upon Clinton and Washington's presence. And we do have to be-- if we just wanted to look at the question of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, here, we have to be, frankly, a bit candid and self-critical.

We simply promised a lot and frankly have delivered very little. I often, in the last few weeks, have reflected upon a line from the 16th century Machiavelli's The Prince, when he advised the prince, it is good to be feared and loved if you want to rule, but remember, if you can't be loved, be feared.

The problem with the Clinton administration is he seemed to somehow want to be loved, but he delivered nothing. I mean, the economic package has been minuscule. Secondly, frankly put, we are not feared. That is, the policies, the failure to carry out a policy in Bosnia, the proliferation of that problem has simply given credibility to the Zhirinovsky's, to the people at war in the Caucasus, that frankly, there is no teeth behind American power. There is no teeth behind Western power.

And to bring things home, it is absolutely essential for security for this generation that Clinton deliver a combined economic and military package, a program for the economic development of Eastern Europe and Russia, and a program for collective military security in some fashion. I don't know if that touched upon or answered all of the things that our caller touched upon, but--

GARY EICHTEN: You hit the high points, I think.

NICK HAYES: I think we came close, I hope.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's take another caller with a question. Hi.

SPEAKER 7: Yes, I have a question in regards to the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. And I would like to clarify the fact that he's specifically sure that all the time, these countries belongs to Russia. Russia was occupation forces since 19-- whatever, 38 or whatever. And in 1918, Latvia claimed independence and celebrated and was accepted internationally.

Then before 1918, the Latvia were also occupied by Poles, by Germans, and by Swedes or Scandinavian countries. And those numbers are stated in historical books in history.

GARY EICHTEN: So your question would be?

SPEAKER 7: My question would be that he is right in his answer that Baltic states belongs to Russia. They have Latvian language and not Russian language, which indicates that Baltic peoples are separate peoples from Russian language peoples and from Russia.

NICK HAYES: I'm sorry, I believe-- are you saying I stated that Zhirinovsky stated that it was part of the Russian Empire? Of course, that was the point that Russian nationalists, it still retained the pretensions that Moscow has the right to rule what was the Russian empire, and this would include everything, as I've said before, from Finland to the Baltic nations to Poland and so forth. That was my point in passing.

We certainly don't mean to deny, of course, the separate nationality to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. That's not the point at all. And the larger issue is this, because we are concerned about the future of the Baltic nations and of course, about the future of all of the new nations created at the conclusion of the Cold War, that their future and the security of Tallinn, Riga, the capital of Latvia, Vilnius, Lithuania, is best secured when frankly, the conditions of the entire region find stability, confidence, and security.

If issues are allowed to flame the nationalist hatreds of a man like Zhirinovsky, well, quite frankly, I'm sure in Riga, in Tallinn, in Vilnius, people know that they'll be the first to feel the brunt of it.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's go back to the phones. Another caller is on the line with a question for Nick Hayes. Hi.

SPEAKER 8: Hi, I wonder if Nick could expand just a little, he just mentioned peripherally the Kaliningrad Oblast. I'm curious, who were the-- it's my understanding that was essentially the northern half of the truncated East Prussia of 1919 that was given to the Russkies.

NICK HAYES: That's right, yes.

SPEAKER 8: And, I wonder, are the Indigenous people Zorbs or Poles or Germans? Are there any left? What is the current status of the capital, Konigsberg, which I believe now for some reason called Kaliningrad? Who controls the Port of Mamel? And are either Poles or Lithuanians forced to accept unlimited Russian troop and supply movements across their land, or is it supplied from Saint Petersburg?

NICK HAYES: There was a number of particular-- first of all, I do not know who the original ethnic components of the country were. You are right, it's the former Konigsberg, and the population historically was mixed, but the upper class, East Prussian. Today, it has been, and it has been for the Soviet experience since 1940, basically a military city.

It's usually just-- first of all, technically, it's part of the Russian Federation, but it is a military base. It's a naval base, and it was classically Soviet. That is, it's predominantly Russian, but includes many mixed nationalities, a fair percentage, by the way, of Central Asians, because it was always the policy of Moscow to use Central Asian troops and support people in the positions along the Baltic.

The Port of Mamel is under the control of the Russian Federation. And I think I may have forgotten a few of your other points.

GARY EICHTEN: There was something about whether troops could--

NICK HAYES: Oh, no, they moved directly, I'm afraid. This is a source of great sensitivity. No, they do not just go by port from Saint Petersburg, if that was your question, but they moved directly by land, air, and sea. They have free movement across the Baltic countries.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's take another caller with a question. Hi.

SPEAKER 9: Yes, I have two quick questions for Mr. Hayes. First of all, I was wondering, sir, with the break up of the Soviet Union, whether or not the rise of Russian nationalism really was a surprise to anyone. And secondly, I wanted your opinions on the future of Russian-German relations in the coming years and how that might affect Poland.

NICK HAYES: All right, two very good questions. And the answer to the first is, the rise of nationalism is, of course, no surprise. When we watched the fall of the communist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, we like to think that this was universally a, let us say, pro-democratic movement.

No, the truth is, it was primarily driven by national feelings of varying degrees of nationalism that, for the most part, represented Russian control, and then the irony that Russians themselves felt that the communist experiment had humiliated Russian traditions, values, and so forth.

So it is not at all surprising now that the means of Soviet power and control, the political institutions are completely gone, that the ideology that replaces it, that becomes the most formidable political force from Belgrade to Moscow, becomes the force of nationalism.

The future of Russian-German relations is an interesting question. And it also touches upon what plans Bonn and Berlin might have for the future as well because historically, there are really two patterns to European security. One is that Russia aligns with the West, France, Britain and the United States, that is, to contain German power. But the other is a second model, that Russia aligns with Germany.

This was the case-- this was Bismarck's great design in the 1870s and '80s, to ally with Austria and Russia. And briefly, from 1922 to 1934, in effect, it was the secret strategy of the Weimar Republic and Russia.

Now, as you look upon NATO politics and what appears to be going on in our own time, if we really followed NATO, we would detect immediately that there is a fault line between Anglo-American opinions and our approach to vote for everything from diplomatic initiatives to economic policy and the German initiatives.

And one could suspect, more or less, a movement somewhere of Germany, more towards a central and east European direction and less towards a western direction, as one of the options that Germany might choose to pursue, let us say, in the next generation. And it certainly could be argued that this would perhaps serve Russia's interests. They have two immediate areas of interest.

They both have immediate concerns with finding some mutual solution to the various problems of Eastern Europe that we've discussed. Secondly, Germany is overwhelmingly Russia's largest economic partner and its most natural economic partner. So it could be quite logical that Moscow should decide. Its future lies in cooperation with Berlin, not with Washington.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's take another caller. Hi.

SPEAKER 10: Hi. I have a different kind of a question, perhaps. Do you think that Russia and China will become more antagonistic as China develops its commerce and well-being?

NICK HAYES: Well, the short-range answer is no because it appears to be that the indications are ironically with the fall of communism. Actually, trade relations between Beijing and Moscow have improved. And in many respects, Beijing provides an economic model that many in Moscow favor. That is, despite the fact that the communist party has fell, the old state bureaucratic structure is still in place.

And point of fact, the number of ministries, the bureaucratic structure of Russia today, is larger than what was under the Soviet Union. And many in Moscow admire the Chinese model, that somehow the bureaucratic structure can survive, and a capitalist market can flourish.

Secondly, there are immediate economic relations that spill over into military relations. And here, I'm referring specifically to arms sales and arms trade. It's no secret that Moscow has insisted on its right to sell various types of armaments to China. China is emerging as one of Russia's larger economic partners, and it's primarily in the military area. And just a final point, China is also a major trading partner in terms of retail and consumer goods with Russia.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's go back to the phones. I think we've got time for at least one more caller. Hi. Hello?

SPEAKER 11: Oh, hello. Hi. I would like to know, who is it going to benefit if they dismantle the nuclear weapons in Ukraine? I mean, it wouldn't be the interest of the world to keep a power there in between Russia and the other nations that would balance the power of-- since Russia has always been a imperial nation.

GARY EICHTEN: Ukraine as a buffer state.

NICK HAYES: The simple, it is best to continue the diplomatic course that began in the Reagan administration and continued through Bush and should be brought to a conclusion, that to follow the diplomatic agreements that were made to reduce overall the level of nuclear weapons.

The second factor is, it's in nobody's interest to see the proliferation of these weapons from Moscow. We have basically four parties that potentially, from the former Soviet Union, could threaten some kind of nuclear intimidation, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan or Central Asia. And obviously, it's better if we have one bargaining partner to deal with in this problem, then in this case, if we have two or we have four.

GARY EICHTEN: Let's go to one more caller. Hi.

SPEAKER 12: Yeah, I'm glad to sneak in here. Dr. Hayes, I have been following this along. I have a brief comment and then a quick question.

GARY EICHTEN: Very brief comment because we're running out of time.

SPEAKER 12: I hope the United States and NATO is not so kind to the Big Bear as an underdog now that they're down because I think historically, they'll get up and they'll gobble up their neighbors again if they can. Now, the comment is, with regard to aid to the former Ukraine, when we send a package of $500 worth of goods to our relatives, we pay $800 or so on some tariff. I'd like to see some effort at reducing that.

And I think the Marshall Plan from people to people trade would just befall that country with some five million Ukrainians living outside of that country. Can you comment on that?

NICK HAYES: Well, the problem you refer to actually gets right to the heart of the unreconstructed economic structure of Ukraine and for that matter, Russia. You're paying a tariff duty that basically feeds bureaucrats. And as long as that bureaucratic structure is unreformed, naturally, you're going to be, in effect, taken.

Let me, I guess, if I was to give my simplest advice on economic aid is the best economic aid we can pursue is indirect. Washington, the IMF does best to support those business and economic ventures here that are willing to take a gamble. And frankly, what we need is, if you will, a private version of the Marshall Plan, not a state version of the Marshall Plan.

And behind all of these discussions, we come back to something that's very important. Russia simply doesn't know what it is yet. Until Russia knows what kind of government it is, we cannot even begin to define the future of Russia's foreign relations, the future of relations with the United States, or frankly, what the future of global security looks like.

GARY EICHTEN: Thanks a lot for coming in today, Nick.

NICK HAYES: Oh, it's always a pleasure, Gary.

GARY EICHTEN: Our guest today, Nick Hayes, who is a history professor at Hamline University in Saint Paul and who is frequently heard here on Minnesota Public Radio. He's one of the area's most respected experts on Russia and Eastern Europe. And you're off to Moscow and Saint Petersburg yet this week?

NICK HAYES: That's right. Wednesday, I'm taking off.

GARY EICHTEN: And we hope to talk with you Friday, then, get some reactions to the Clinton address. He'll be talking to the people of Moscow on TV early Friday morning our time. And we'll have that-- planned to have that on Midday at noon. And we'll be talking with Nick sometime during the program as well.