Good afternoon. I'm Jerry Joseph senior fellow at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of public affairs. And a member of the Minnesota meeting board of directors. I want to extend a welcome both to the audience in this room and to the radio audience throughout the Upper Midwest, which is hearing this program live on Minnesota public radio's. Midday program. This broadcast is sponsored by the Oppenheimer wolf Donnelly Law Firm Minnesota meeting as many of you know, is a public affairs Forum which brings National and international speakers to Minnesota more than 1800 corporate government. And Community leaders are members the next scheduled speaker for Minnesota meeting is Senator Richard Lugar who will speak here on October 26th. His timely speech is titled the pursuit of Freedom when should AmericaToday's speaker is John morose a leading Authority on East-West political-military Affairs and Middle East security issues. He currently is founder and president of the institute for East-West security studies in New York a consultant to the United States government industry and Foundations. He has a strong academic specialization in diplomatic history and foreign policies in communist areas. During the last six months a 37 member task force called Together by The Institute for East-West security studies has been meeting to assess the much publicized efforts of reform in the Soviet Union and to suggest policy responses for the United States. The group will present its report at an International Conference in st. Paul this weekend. Dr. Murrow's will be talking about the conclusions of this report, which already has attracted considerable attention. Although it's my understanding. It has not yet been formally released at the conclusion of his speech. Dr. Murrow's will be delighted to answer your questions and the index cards at your table should be used to jot down questions during the speech Minnesota meeting is very pleased to present today's Speaker John morose. Thank you very much. It's Jerry. It's nice to see you again after a few years and I thank the Minnesota meeting for the invitation to come and to address you a few months ago. I had the pleasure of appearing on Bob Potter's show. I Minnesota Public Radio and I learned then that the minnesotans have lots of questions. And so I'm going to keep my remarks relatively brief so that we can we can take questions and I'm sure it'll be plenty on this on this subject. I might just at the onset mentioned that the audience both here and in the ballroom and listening will be able to listen to the entire conference that Jerry is just talked about on the implications of Soviet new thinking which begins tonight at seven at seven o'clock tonight with a major speech by West German foreign minister hans-dietrich genscher who is flying here to the Twin Cities to give that speech. They'll be three NATO foreign ministers John Whitehead the senator Bradley other members of Congress and quite a quite a number of important people from Europe and the United States who will come to listen to the formal presentation of the task force report. Which is entitled how should America respond to Gorbachev's challenge? It's a bipartisan group made up of people as many Republicans as Democrats the report as Jerry said has begun to generate some some significant interest not only in this country, but in other countries as well, you also can those of you with C-SPAN can also watch the program delay will be broadcast all during next week nationally on the C-SPAN television network. The topic that I was asked to speak about in specifically is u.s. Soviet relations historic change or business as usual now, the news right now is filled with stories about the Soviet Union. We had mr. Gorbachev disappear for a number of weeks his wife disappear. We have a summit coming up. We have an agreement which the French and some others including emit. Some Americans are not happy with on INF issues. What I'd like to do is not so much talk about the the Contemporary news, but I'd like to do a little bit of what's behind it and to talk a little bit about about the top. From the point of view of well, let me do it with three aspects first. Let's take the let's take the to the tube sections of the title. Is it business as usual or historic change in our relations with the Soviet Union when I look at business as usual, I don't know what that means. What is business as usual with the United States relations with the Soviet Union. We've done just about everything one can do in a relationship. We had some armed intervention During the Revolution many years ago. We were close allies and in World War Two we were we were foes in a very bitter cold war we lived through a period of date aunt and so on so when we talk about business as usual, I'm not quite sure what that means and I don't think it's perhaps a useful useful kind of a way to look at it. So let's look at the other one historic change. Is there a possibility that we are entering a period where us Soviet relations May. In fact, May in fact be in for a historic change and I think here the answer to that is that it's possible and I believe it is possible. It's perhaps a little bit too early and I think a large part of it depends depends on two factors depends first and primarily on what happens within the Soviet Union and to me personally it comes down to a question of how the Soviet Union chooses to use its power both on it with its own citizens at home and outside its own its own borders. And this is one of the key questions are key themes that I like to run through my to my remarks today. I think it is possible to transform the the historic way the nature of the competition not the competition itself. We are both Global superpowers. It is likely we will both remain Global superpowers for many years to come but it is possible that if certain Trends which I'll outline continue I believe in my colleagues are mostly below share this belief that it is possible that the nature of the competition the very heavy military and ideological emphasis of the competition could in fact shift to a much heavier emphasis on economic political and diplomatic. Shannan cooperation. I think there's two sides to every relationship with this with with any country and with the Soviet Union. We can very definitely see periods when we had much more cooperation much more competition and I'll talk about this in terms of the near future. Let me say first what I think is happening in the Soviet Union because to me this is the this is the most important issue. I believe the Soviet Union is experiencing its third Revolution. There was the revolution of Lenin there was a revolution of Stalin not kind of Revolution. We like a lot of times revolutions are not things we like and now there's another Revolution and the revolution I believe is every bit as dramatic the revolution is in part to end the stylization period but it's also much more than that and that's what I'd like to talk about here today and I believe the changes which Gorbachev and his colleagues have begun to initiate in the Soviet Union. We now can document are not simply rhetorical but are also beginning to be borne out in policy and that we have to look at carefully at what it means. We must be cautious not naive but I do think we also On the other hand cannot any longer afford to stand back and take a wait-and-see attitude as to what's going to happen. We are at a Crossroads across roads can be defined my favorite definition from the dictionary is a crucial point where a decision must be made and that leads to the second set of remarks. I'll make and that will be on the United States how we in the United States and the Western allies choose to respond to what's happening to the Soviet Union's in the Soviet Union and by the Soviet Union, there's a hopeful sign as I said, let me start about the historic opportunity with what's happening in the Soviet Union. I believe there is a hopeful sign in the sense that one can begin to detect very very clear ways where there is a moderation of the use of Power by the Soviet Union in ways that is quite dramatic the Soviet Union. Also, I think we can see is moving in many fields not just in Arms Control towards long-standing Western preferences in areas like arms control, but also human rights Regional issues and others. Let me talk about give you a few examples in the area of arms control for For example, we Face ourselves with an IMF agreement, which I believe will be signed and I assume will be ratified after a bitter debate in the Senate but what basically that is is the Soviets accepted a NATO a western largely an American proposal a proposal which granted the people who proposed it said they propose with the idea of the Soviets would never accept it nonetheless. It was our proposal. They did accept it. If you look in various areas of verification, if you look at on-site inspection, if you look at the the desire for a deep deep reductions and strategic weapons including now the Soviets agreeing to include heavy missiles where the Soviet Union has a very strong dominance in that area and it's perhaps the single greatest threat to our national security. If you look at all these areas one can clearly see that the Soviet Union's policy since Gorbachev has taken over have clearly moved in the direction of long-standing Western preferences the INF agreement itself with its which I personally support all those Does have all kinds of implications for us with NATO which Jerry and I were talking about during lunch and which we can talk about the question and answer period but the INF agreement which Reagan and Gorbachev are likely to sign around Thanksgiving is is important I think from particularly from one point of view and that is this is not just an arms control agreement. It's an arms reduction agreement. We're talking about eliminating an entire category of weapons. Now, this is the first time this has happened. We've had what we've all heard arms control arms control arms control. I was part of the arms control academic Community as many others are we had a whole profession build up around the concept of arms control, but what did Arms Control actually contribute in practice in a practical sense over a period of several decades? The answer is not very much. And here we have we have example of something which is clearly a reduction and elimination of a category of weapons, which I think is a very important development and I look forward to your questions on that together with this and related to this is some very clear evidence that the Soviet Union the military Are having a less significant role in the highest level of policy circles that and that they also it's very clear. I've been told they're going to have to accept unprecedented spending restraints. And I think this is these are all very important developments the idea that the so of the Soviets including their military journals are now talking about military sufficiency is something which which many of us tribute a very high degree of interest in because it reflects a difference in the way in which the Soviet Union conceptualizes. It's situation if if all of us would take a map right now, I'm sorry. I don't have one. But if we were to take a map right now and look at all the borders of the Soviet Union, it's actually a fairly nasty picture. If you take an issue like proliferation of nuclear weapons to us. It's very much a secondary issue. But if you look at which countries are either now having nuclear weapons or are about to have them or could have the cape the have the capacity to have them you'll see that almost all of them are on the borders of the Soviet Union and so you have in this whole concept of a rethinking going on right now in the Soviet Union. It's defense Concepts about its military doctrines a very unusual. In fact a shocking debate for us in the west to witness a public debate. Now starting in the Soviet Union and its eastern European allies about the whole question of military Doctrine what's going on now granted. This is the start of a debate. We don't see where it's where it's necessarily going to go. But the very fact that debate is started as something which many of us feel is is significant. Let me move on to trade and economic policies. I think that I don't have to belabor the point here that the the domestic reforms which Gorbachev has initiated are in fact revolutionary. They are radical the Turning Point. Most of us didn't really believe that until last June this past June in June 25 26 when the Central Committee had its had his meeting in Moscow and the results of that meeting shocked just about every Western Observer and Soviet ologist that I know and people said everyone concluded that just about everyone concluded that if you really look at what happened that the gore The Gorbachev is serious and that these domestic reforms economic reforms and restructuring reforms the whole the whole perestroika operation is something which is going to which is going to take a long time may or may not succeed but is already dramatic and revolutionary and I think we think we should we should accept that 444 what it is and that is a major effort to address some of the Soviet Union's basic inadequacies, which I'll talk about in a minute. When I dress why I think these changes are happening the Soviet Union has showed a very surprising interest in cooperating more fully with the International System. They've talked about joining gats. They've talked about the World Bank the IMF. We obviously have mixed emotions about that why we're very skeptical. What is this? What's the intentions of the Soviets to come in but they're showing in very many areas including in like the Asian region and others strong interest in becoming more integrated into the international economic system. Now, some of you may say, why do we want that to happen? That's something we can argue on both an ideological and Tactical level. I think there are very strong arguments to be made for the fact that the Soviet Union becoming more fully integrated into the community of Nations. And abiding by the rules and regulations of that Community is to be welcomed by the International Community a Gorbachev's reforms encourage economic interest, which had been previously underrepresented in Soviet policy making which if you look at it carefully, there's evidence that this could offset and affect the way in which in which the Soviet Union relates to the outside world. You can offset some of the traditional ways some of the entrench party bureaucrats and their influence by bringing a new set of voices a new set of primary actors in the Soviet in the Soviet economy and one can see that in fact actually beginning to happen. By the way. I'll just bake an aside on Eastern Europe that in the next few months. We're going to be witnessing some very very surprising announcements by in Eastern Europe in Poland in Bulgaria, perhaps more than anyone and in Czechoslovakia. They're going to be announcing economic reforms that go beyond in some This is the Hungarian reforms in which go beyond things that Gorbachev has said and I think you're going to find between now and the end of December a lot of raised eyebrows as to what is happening in the socialist countries of the east in terms of the of the economic policies and the restructuring that's going on the human rights and culture area. Obviously a central concern as it should be for the West here. We can start by noting that there is an openness and a toleration Unthinkable just just two years ago when I was in Moscow on my last trip Andrei sakharov was telling a group of us that the Americans who go to the Soviet Union don't ask the right questions. He said why don't you ask young people has anything in your life changed since Gorbachev since Gorbachev took over took power. He said let's ask that question and listen to the answer and a couple of us did to a wide variety of young people in this was in Moscow and the answer that we that we got most frequently had something to do with this summarize at this way that for the first time in their lives what they talked about in their place of work their place of employment. The same thing they talked about in their kitchens. Now that may not sound very significant sitting here in Minneapolis, but it is very significant. If you think of what that means that for that for the first time something you only felt free enough to talk about with your immediate family. You wouldn't even necessarily discuss with your friends and distant relatives a suddenly you can talk about anywhere and that is a feeling which young people have and I think that's that's an interesting side. When you look at the human rights and culture side that there is the beginning of some openness. There is the beginning of a pluralization that I think should be welcomed regardless of whether Gorbachev succeeds in the in the long run should be welcomed for its own sake as well as for the effects that these kinds of changes are having on moderating the way in which the Soviet Union uses power against its own citizens. George Shultz said after his recent meeting with shevardnadze in Washington that he was used the word shocked by the by the type of the tone of the tone of the conversation. He said never had he experienced a conversation with a Soviet on the subject of human. It's which was as relaxed and and which were in which was as open and as forthright as that discussion, I understand on October October 14th. There's going to be another one of these space bridges on ABC strictly devoted for two hours to human rights with the broadcast beaming being beamed directly into the Soviet Union. I for one would like to watch that and see what those how the Soviets are planning to handle the question of human rights for two hours with with the American counterpart audience. But the fact is that there is some substantial things happening in the Soviet Union and in other countries in the middle of November, we understand Poland is going to announce that what it will be absolutely the most far-reaching new policies dealing with recognition of ideological opposition, and we're not quite sure exactly how what form that's going to take but there's very good evidence to believe that is going to be some very very significant movement in a speech by our results key coming in November. So these things are happening there's a ferment and there's something which is happening not just in the Soviet Union, but also in the other socialist countries of the Eastern Europe as well. Let me talk very briefly on Regional issues. I think there's sufficient evidence to show the Gorbachev understands that military power alone cannot provide influence for the Soviet Union in the third world as it has in the past the Soviet Union if you look at its overall record in the third world as had a Bissell record, it's not it's not had the kind of Glorious record that's been painted for now. It's true that in Afghanistan in Nicaragua and other areas of Soviet Union has not Fallen back from its commitments, but it's also true that is not under gorbachov take it taken on a similar type of new commitments like this and there's also evidence in areas like Afghanistan that they are extremely serious. And I think there's a growing number of Specialists who deal with this subject who believe that the Soviets before too terribly long will will come up with some some final proposals to find a way out of the out of the morass possibly with un peacekeeping or some kind of a third party for us, which may have to be you have to be brought in but I think that you can look into different number of areas take the Middle East. Example in the past the Soviet Union the Soviet Union relied primarily on shipment and sales of arms that was its major its major ability to influence or giving money to PLO and other groups and it also ideological there's a military ideological kind of relationship take a look at it. Look at his relationship with Syria. But look today at the same kind of relationship the Soviet Union has D emphasize dramatically and and demonstrably it's shipment of arms for example to Syria. It can be shown quite quite clearly that they're not giving the quality or quantity of weapons to Syria. They were giving a year ago or two years ago let alone two years ago and they're talked about wanting to be part of a peace process the rest now granted we could say that's a trick. You know, what does this mean? Is this really serious? But the point is that there one can begin to see a very clear pattern where diplomacy and economics are in politics are replacing the as the primary thrust of Soviet policy in a region like that. I think the United States should Challenge gorbachov in a positive way to take up some of his offers he's off. The number of times far-reaching cooperation for with us again on terrorism and I think we should engage we should engage him in that kind of discussion and see how seriously is same thing with the Middle East. Is he serious or is he serious or not? There's one way to find out and if he is serious and if in fact he is willing to to put the economic and political and diplomatic initiatives ahead of military and ideological and then I think we have to give serious thought to the strong feeling in this country that they should be excluded from that region in Asia. We can also talk about the tremendous Soviet Naval build up over the 1970s and 80s, which is now now slowing down and where there is much more emphasis by the Soviet Union again and economic and diplomatic why these changes I mean, let me let me conclude by the formal remarks by talking a little bit about why why across the board such serious changes have taken place. I see some of you going now for your question cards and I encourage you to do that. Hopefully, I've given you a few things to write about let me let me give you a couple of points that I think are. Factors, which after talking to a lot of Soviets and to a lot of people from Eastern Europe who are close to the Soviets or who are know them. Well what they identify as the cluster of reasons why this change has come about the agreement. Is it Gorbachev? It's not a Gorbachev born in Bethlehem. This is not some super kid who came in and did something very dramatic that that concept as it says it's used in Europe is something which its Gorbachev is important. He was the Catalyst that helped bring certain things to fruition, but that there was some other things in place which made it possible for him to do what he's done and what he's doing. The first is the fact that the first factor is that the internal the internal Soviet stagnation the economic stagnation and the tremendous sense of apathy particularly among young people alcoholism. And if you saw the statistics was a dramatic problem for the for Soviet Society in a way that you just could not believe here much worse than our drug problem in this country. The apathy of young people was tremendous. Is a real fear that China of all countries might overtake the Soviet Union in both not only in political terms, but also in economic terms. This would be even more traumatic than the debate in France, you know you some of you may have followed that the French are now openly talking that in a couple years Italy is going to overtake France as an economic power and this for any Frenchman is sort of the the alt the ultimate disaster. Well, if you could understand that if you can understand that you cannot begin to imagine the the geometric progression of the Russians thinking that about the Chinese and this was one whole cluster of issues which which I think very definitely entered into this and by the way it explains also the whole question of the Soviet Union's role and it's it's stagnation Visa be the other parts of the world is also something which may explain why the KGB and the Soviet military were the two earliest groups to support Gorbachev, very interesting the KGB the military and part of the intelligencia where he wear his we're his initial. Which one C and this made this may be part of the explanation for that. The second is a need for stability and that was dramatic dramatized very very clearly for the Soviets in 1981 in Poland in martial law when they came awfully close to having to do something which it's clear. They did not want to do but would have done they are increasingly realizing that is an option where that is not an option any longer that everything else they're talking about doing for example, the arms reduction agreements with the United States everything the entire program. We've been outlining would be shattered would be if tanks rolled into Prague as they did in 68 and the Soviet leadership. I think it's clear to say understands that there is a tremendous sense of rising expectations among the young people in the in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries as well. There's the course the Soviet Union has a minority question a very significant questions. Not a problem at this point, but it is a question for the future the third area I would identify is the technology Gap. There's been a lot written about this. The fact is in a few technologies that are ahead of us, but overall there is clear and a growing technological. No, Gap particularly where it affects the consumer the non-military sectors of the of the society and this is something which as you have the rising expectations the apathy and all the rest and better information coming from from various sources about what the other part of the world has this this poses potential big problems for the Soviet leadership. And then I think there's a genuine recognition. I wasn't convinced of this until until this year that there is a genuine conviction by the Soviet leadership that the International System has changed that the that the the slogans and the philosophies of the 1930s and 40s simply were not adequate any longer Chernobyl obviously was was a dramatic and a shock and still a shock those of you who've been to the Soviet Union, you know that this is this is not so we talked about Three Mile Island here and we said oh, yeah. Well Three Mile Island and the Soviet Union Chernobyl is very deep as a very deep and ingrained memory for them, which I think will last for a long time the whole concept of interdependence that the Soviets could not go at themselves that they cannot exclude themselves from Global problems, whether it's Lucien or aids for the longest time on AIDS the Soviets and their East European allies all reported. They had one case and then suddenly Romania reported had to and somebody else than went to to and now suddenly that's all broken down and there's there's open discussion that these kinds of things whether it's pollution whether its nuclear disasters, whether it's AIDS or anything else does not respect ideological or territorial borders and the Soviet Union no matter what it wants to do and how close the society it is cannot insulate and isolate its citizens from from these kinds of issues. Also, I think the complexity of the International System. This is a much different world than it was when Joseph Stalin was was there even when Brezhnev was was there the fifth area of Eric including is that is that Gorbachev clearly understands that the Soviet Union has entered that the Soviet Union like everyone else in the developed world has to enter into the information age that the movement of goods and raw materials is less important in this world than financial flows and movement of services ideas. And I think this is something which he clearly understands. I've had many Soviets quota West German study that they just find it incomprehensible that by the Year 2005 only five percent of the workforce in North America Europe. And Japan will be in manufacturing only five percent. That's about what agriculture is today. I think is that right? I shouldn't say that Minnesota coming from New York, but I think that's about where it is somewhere down there and that is a 2% Okay a 2% but the the point is I mean the Russians look and they say how is that possible 5% of your of your Workforce as in manufacturing in the Year 2005. How is that possible? What does that mean? And it happened they get into these kinds of discussions and I'm talking at a very senior level within the within the party. So I think all of these issues together perhaps explain explain at least part of the reason of why why the kinds of changes which I've outlined here that I believe are going on and the Soviet Union are going on now, let me conclude by saying a few things which may mean a few people have to tear up your cards the Soviet Union remains a close communist society and we have to Stand that everything go out Gorbachev is doing is to protect the Soviet Union's vital National interest which is obvious and to preserve the Soviet Union's role as a superpower in The Next Century something which by the way a great number of people in the KGB. We understand in the military and intelligence Iya feel that could be jeopardized particularly in an age when it's increasingly clear that nuclear weapons, which is the real pillar of superpower status with the Soviet Union probably could never be used and if that's true then the Soviet Union The Next Century on its old course the brushing of course had really no superpower Global future. I think we must well, I guess let me in there are some other points but I don't wanna take away all your questions. So let me let me end there and be glad to take your questions and thank you for your attention. Dr. Murrow's has been very kind. He's given us an extra five minutes for questions this afternoon, and it's now question time. Jane mrazek who is executive director of Minnesota meeting is going to be moving among you with a microphone. We're hoping that by managing this Q&A period that this will be a more efficient way to do it in many more of you will be able to ask questions. It is my hope you notice that what dr. Murrow's concentrated on is the apparent changes in the Soviet Union their desire for change. They didn't say anything about how we should react. I certainly hope some of the questions will be about that. Thank you Jerry. Thank you John looks as though we have a lot of questions so we can start right here. I'm dr. Coleman. Do Gorbachev and a small group stand alone against the military and old party members or does he have manifest support in the general population such as the church? my second question would be is his opposition merely lying in wait, would they dare to assassinate him? Is the policy here to take several questions at once or do answer them? One-on-one? Okay. Let me take the last one first assassination. I there was a lot of speculation there still is a lot of speculation among specialists in the west and in the East that that both Gorbachev and his wife were in fact, the the intended victims of an assassination. I certainly certainly would not be something unusual for Russian history to have that to have that happen or in fact from our own countries point of view modern contemporary history and in any developed Society, so I think the I would not rule out. I don't think anyone would rule out the fact that there are some people who are so desperately against him who would go to any lengths to do it. I think that's perhaps probably clear. They're also an awful lot of people in some of you need who do not like his wife and her style at all. They think she's totally totally totally she's bearing a western politicians wives role and and not a not a Russian type role and they have very great resentment when she bought her jewelry and Cartier's and they report it was only American Express. That was that was really more than and you should hear the jokes going through Soviet Soviet Society in terms of Gorbachev. So I don't that was never verified an executive American Express once told me and I asked him the question. He said we're certainly not going to deny it anyway Gorbachev. So it's not meant to be a plug. I have nothing to do with them. But anyway, that's Gorbachev in terms of his position in the Soviet Union what we know the one thing that is clear is that he has complete support varies very let's say he has overwhelming support in the politburo, which is the top decision-making body. It's clearly his people he's totally in control. He has control but not not such an impressive control in the Central Committee which which is something which is worth watching most people are watching the military up till now have actually and the KGB as we mentioned until well the KGB recently has made some statements. Mr. Trebek off the head of the KGB has made some statements about glass knows which have which have caught the caught our attention but there's still no evidence that the KGB in the military have are anything other than supportive of him. You know, why not because he's weakening them and the rest but because they see this as a way to improve the strength the economic strength and the infrastructure of the Soviet society as far as how the average person feels. The reason why I raised the soccer off point was actually in the towards this question and that is that most western observers including myself were going the Soviet Union said, you know, the one thing we don't see is how the average Russian is benefiting by the from the sky what this guys doing and they can't they can't drink as much they can't you know, you're taking all these things away but you're not giving them you're not giving them VCRs and Walt Disney movies. So, you know, what? What are they getting for what they're doing and what they're giving up and what they're being asked to sacrifice for that was when soccer off gave that answer that but you know in the early stages there's something else which they're getting which is something they've never had which is Meaningful to them. And that was the point of that obviously it's very very difficult to assess right now most observers that that I know of from Europe and the United States and from Eastern Europe agree that he's firmly in control. I understand that. Mr. Gorbachev is going to write a book and have it published in the US. Could you verify that actually several of his things have been published by think? They've been collections of speeches the this one? I don't give all that much. I'm a sister that I mean, I think it's I think it's fine when when when this kind of thing happens, but there is stories that he the read stories that one of the reasons he was secluded for so long as he was actually finishing up that book. There's a lot of speculation that don't think anybody really knows A concern of mine is that the American Press seems to think that we're not proceeding fast enough and the changes in Soviet Union are not coming fast. But to me, it appears that mr. Gorbachev is trying to take the lid off of a pressure cooker how fast can we really expect him to do this without it blowing up? This is of course is the ultimate question and by the way, it could blow up in other places than in that in the Soviet Union many many observers feel and some government officials feel that Gorbachev. Saw ultimate downfall could come in Eastern Europe. But you know, what does he do when all of this? You know, let's let's say of Czechoslovakia things really started going and it gets out of control as it did in 68 with the Czech. Army just couldn't handle it. What does he do and that this this could be used very definitely against him. I guess the were I would come down and a lot of others and I take it the pressure talking about will come down to the fact that they're there right now rather than taking a stand back and sort of wait and see attitude. We should recognize the fact that there are changes being taken in that country which are in the Western interest as we shouldn't be, you know supporting change in the Soviet Union just for the sake of supporting change in the Soviet Union, but it seems to me when when any of these policies of Gorbachev lead to for example a moderation of the use of Soviet power it seems to me that's in our interest if it makes them a more responsible and more integrated member the National community and less Renegade e and their activities around the world and against their own citizens. I think that should be supported to I think that's the nature where at least well that's where I'm coming from. You know, I think no one obviously can answer the question. Will he succeed long term? It's absolutely absolutely impossible to know but what do we do? Then? We just simply say well let's let's forget what's going on and and we'll wait long term. I don't think we can be in a reactive mode like that. The Soviet Union is a global superpower and for example, its diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East in Asia and South America. Look just recently in South America unprecedented what happened in shevardnadze's visit in South America this past week. I don't think we can afford to sit back and and simply say well, let's see if he's real and he's going to last Do you see any change in the control of the press within the Soviet Union? Oh, yes, very very dramatic. There's a debate raging. I mean there's there's different camps. But you have many things coming out which are absolutely unprecedented. I'm talk about open criticisms in the Press printed in the in the public press what's most significant to some of us is that this is just starting the last few months. This kind of debate has started in the actually in the military journals, which is which is always been you know, the holy of holies if you use that expression for the Soviets, but yes, you can you can turn to unprecedented articles being printed in Soviet journals and Soviet newspapers, one of them you some of you may have seen in the Wall Street Journal they reprinted part of it because it was so incredible. It basically said that a socialist system the Soviet Union was totally unworkable and that they had to move to complete market market economy this with this appeared in the leading Soviet Journal Gorbachev was asked by the way was asked to comment on that article and he said that he found the analysis interesting didn't agree with all his conclusions. But I mean the fact that they even that can go on is is pretty a pretty amazing. If you remember where the Soviet Union was three years ago, and we forget that you know, Gorbachev has only been around for a little more than two and a half years as the general secretary. He was around a little bit before that behind the scenes but the Soviets went through a very difficult period for the Russian character those of you who've read anything about Russian literature and and know much about the Russian people the three funerals the three leaders of heads of state who died in three years and they have three three funerals and three years is the way it said in the Soviet Union that was traumatic for the Russian people absolutely traumatic for them to have that sense of uncertainty. And this by the way is one of the things that gave gorbachov some initial support in the Soviet Union that he was able to build on that there was that feeling in my God, you know, we need somebody who's in control here. And anyway, I don't think that's your question. Okay. Okay, let me slip one of mine in here for a minute you indicate in your report that you're going to release tomorrow that a rapid Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has an important litmus test of Soviet desire for international stability How likely do you think that rapid withdrawal is and what should the u.s. Do about it? The the UN negotiator who is who has been doing the the Afghan negotiations which which are which had made quite a bit of progress over the over the duration believes very strongly as do by the way a number of people in the administration and in Europe that the Soviets now, it's very clear. They now definitely do want to get out of Afghanistan that is clear that the problem is that they need what they call some kind of international guarantees which which we have to see whether or not all of us are willing to pay those those guarantees to have the Soviet troops withdraw what the Soviets are very fearful of and I think with good reason is that once they do withdraw their troops. There will be a civil war in Afghanistan and the pro-soviet factions are very unlikely to be to remain in power. And if you know the Afghani anything about the Afghani people coalition's are not particularly likely so that so that you have a situation of what could be what could become you know, their ultimate worry is a another NATO, you know type country on their border and if you look at again and look at a map and Afghanistan is not a joke for them in terms of it's a strategic position. So I think there's mounting evidence that they really do want to get out certainly in their talks with the administration. We understand that they that the this but they were very positive and very forthcoming. The other thing that's new in the Soviet Union is very open discussion on television and the newspapers about the the problems of the FK of their soldiers who come back from Afghanistan. The drug problem is openly discussed now in the newspapers the problem of it sounds very much like our Vietnam our Vietnam veterans when they came back about the society not wanting to take care of them. There are tremendous articles now appearing openly and major Soviet periodicals and newspapers talking documenting that and it's a Deja Vu for those of us who remember what happened after at the conclusion of the Vietnam I was intrigued by your remark near the end of regarding the Soviet military and intelligence communities that conclusion that the USSR could not remain a superpower into the 21st century by relying on nuclear military hardware and I'm wondering what implications this has for our own Reliance on nuclear military power particularly Star Wars and as it relates to our our dependence on nuclear power in Europe, and whether the fear that the Soviets would invade Europe without the nuclear deterrent it continues to be a valid one. I think your last point. I let me start with that. I think the the issue now conventional arms and Europe is obviously the issue and it's now the issue and so real issue. If you look at the at the force deployments of for structures of Warsaw Pact forces, there are especially their forward-deployed armored. There's absolutely no question that this has offensive capabilities. If you look at ours, it's very clear from the if anyone would objectively go and look at this on paper that ours do not the the this has to be addressed and there isn't and it's going to have to be addressed through an asymmetrical reductions. I think the the most the boldest thing gorbachov could do now would in fact be to come up in the conventional area with proposals as bold as he did in the in the nuclear Iran on the nuclear question itself. The I think from the general consensus among a lot of my colleagues is the fact that there are two people in the world for sure who apparently do believe that getting rid of all nuclear weapons would be good. That's mr. Reagan and mr. Gorbachev that does not go very far down with their advisors or others. I think most people feel that you once you've invented nuclear weapons. It's almost impossible to imagine their total elimination. However, one could one could and one should severely reduce the numbers. We certainly don't need the types of the when talk about 50,000 Warheads. We're talking something that's beyond the scope of a Donation my face. I recently statistic where if you look at the population of the world, which is a know how many billions now that the amount of TNT per person comes out something like 400 tons of TNT per person or some 400 pounds of TNT per person and some on credit incredible thing for every man woman and child on the earth. That's absolutely crazy. And no one everyone knows I'm both sides NATO and Warsaw Pact that a nuclear that an all-out nuclear war will pretty much mean destruction. By the way. You should look also at the nuclear winter Theory which is a lot of attempts to discredit it, but you'll notice that both the Pentagon and the Soviet military had both issued statements saying that it is possible that nuclear winter theory is valid. If it is then of course, it goes even further as an argument making nuclear weapons irrelevant. The the question of what we do to reduce nuclear weapons is obviously more complicated than just what the US and the Soviet Union wish to do. Can anyone here imagine the French giving up the force to flop someone as an Actually, who said can you imagine what France would be without the forced to Rob without its nuclear weapons? There's a growing consider thing. There was Italy and France the and I think you know that it's going to be a very very complicated issue. But I think that the possibility for at least a 50% reduction which was agreed to in the journey in Geneva by Reagan and Gorbachev is doable and is in our national interest in the Soviet National interest and I think that will be a major first step if we can get 50% reduction down if we can have a verification regime with the INF that actually both sides can have confidence in then I think we begin to move that's that's a you know, we still have to say it's not clear you concluded your speech by discussing five reasons explaining the Soviet Union's new policy of gloss noticed. I noticed by its absence that you didn't discuss as one of the reasons United States foreign policy and I'm wondering if glass nose has occurred in spite of or because of President Reagan's rather Cold War. Rhetoric in short you can just answer it by saying his President Reagan's policy one in which he can take credit for the glass nosed Evolution. I think he could take you can take some credit. Yes. I think though if you look over you have to look back farther. I don't think you can just isolate a seven-year period I think we if we look back at American and American foreign policy since the second world war despite all of its terrible failures and problems overall. It hasn't been too bad and it has in fact done. A lot of the things it was designed to do vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and I think that has also been a factor and that's a fair factor. I was talking about internal situations in the sub in the Soviet Union in my discussion, but that would obviously their external causes as well of which that would be that I think fairly that would be one What are the most effective ways that Americans either citizens our policymakers can build on some of the modest improvements made in the Soviets treatment of its citizens particularly the dissident citizens and still insist that they make progress toward their commitments under the Helsinki Accord. I need to continue doing very much what we're doing. I think basically our policy on human rights is the right policy and that that I'm not talking now by I'm talking now not partisan politics Republican Democrat. I think there is a so, I think there is close to a national consensus in this country. Perhaps an unannounced one about the fact that you know, we have a certain responsibility and a moral obligation to continue to press for on the issue of Human Rights the Soviets by the way are going to counter press us on human rights to and talk about the the right of everyone to have free education for everyone to have free medical care. They're going to they're going to be doing they're going to the there's another side to what constitutes human rights, but the the I think you know in terms of our view of Human Rights and what's important and I believe Leaving it is something which which should be continued. I think we should also acknowledge and to as our I love our human rights groups are doing that. The situation is improving. I mean, I think we also have to acknowledge and accept the fact publicly that yes, you know, we appreciate the fact that soccer off is released from Gorky. We appreciate the fact that immigration is up for Jews and also for others. We appreciate the fact that you've not done this or you're doing this and I think that's so I would say to continue very much what we're doing in a constructive way. I also think and the report talks for example about the jackson-vanik and Stephenson amendments and that is on the which links economics and human rights. And that is that if the Soviets continued their Improvement of Human Rights, we should examine re-examine the US Congress and the administration whoever's in power should in fact re-examine the the validity of those two pieces of legislation. Here we go. I'm curious about to what degree do you think the actions of Gorbachev to just to affect International public relations are the motivation of what he says and does does he do it mostly for the world? Generally it certainly is the impression that I get just International public relations are so important to both sides. Well Gorbachev it first of all, is it a superb politician? We don't have to like him and we have to respect them in a lot of areas, but he's a darn good politician. One thing that every good politician knows is that your first audience that you appeal to is your own constituency and I think we often times make a mistake here in the in the United States and in the West in general of misunderstanding. That's that everything that's said or everything that's done is meant to directly affect the United States or Western Europe or whatever. That's not to say that they aren't clever that they don't use propaganda. They do all of that but I think we M overemphasize sometimes and we neglect to see that he has his own constituency problem in the Soviet Union that What he has to say is something which is very very important the Soviets for example are always saying why do you Americans always quote that stupid Khrushchev thing. We will bury you, you know, that was taken out of context. That's not what he meant. You know, it was meant for a Soviet audience. You know, why did you guys take that and other people I've heard people talk about the evil empire speech the Reagan gave down on the south and they said, you know that Reagan didn't mean that for the Russians that was meant for a group of very conservative Southern Baptist that he was speaking to at a meeting down there and don't the Russians know that isn't just what he meant, of course later on he reiterated and other forms to declare that it was what he meant. But but the argument the argument of you know, who's this for and what's this supposed to be affecting? It can be a very convenient very complicated issue. I think a lot of Gorbachev obviously is is public relations, but I think the majority of that is public relations within his own country and I think we have to think we have to remember that the difference between a speech like this now and one year ago. Is that a year ago? I would we be talking much more abstractly where we couldn't see so much policy implications today and what Trying to show is that there are specific things like, you know, we can measure the arms transfers to Syria. That's no longer a theory that Gorbachev said we should slow down transferring arms to the Middle East. That's that's a statement that's rhetoric that maybe public relations. But when you can actually document a dramatic decrease in the arms transfers and the sophistication of the arms one can say okay, you know, there's clearly something here where policy is being affected by the by fact as well as well as the rhetoric. I have a question seems to me the one of the goals of the Russians has been to split the NATO alliance in split off the u.s. From Europe. It does seem also that Gorbachev is tending to put a lot of pressure on that Alliance. And do you believe that's true that the course that he's following May split the alliance and if so, what can the alliance do to keep intact? It's a good question. I mean, there's no there's no doubt in the Russians say it openly that they like to see the end of both military alliances. Don't hide the fact. I'd like to see NATO NATO disbanded. So that's clear. Obviously, they wouldn't cry should the United States troops and and nuclear stockpiles and other things but withdrawn from the from the European continent, that's that's absolutely clear. And again, if you if we were all sitting there as the visors are Gorbachev what you'd be that's it's quite obvious. That's--that would be your position gromyko made that a very big policy of his for many years when he was foreign minister and flopped. Notoriously, I mean, in fact it was just one series of disasters after another of trying to blatantly intervene and interfere in Western Europe and ways to bring that about Gorbachev is much more clever much more clever and obviously a much more worthy adversary in that sense for us. And I think this is where we in the west have to one of the things this report. We've been to referring to which will be in a lot of the newspapers and all starting tomorrow with his recommendations and all the report really puts an awful lot of the responsibility on us that we shouldn't just be reactive. We've got to get our own act together for example right now our relations with the French On security policy are at a very very low point the French have gone into agreement with the Germans the franco-german Brigade. They're talking about franco-german defense counsel outside of NATO there, you know, a lot of this is there's a lot happening there and there's a lot of flux. I am not I don't think it's a crisis at this point, but I think we are going to have to be be much more much more clever and and more is more than clever gonna have to make a much bigger effort with our allies to try to get our own act together about what it is that that we want one of the questions that we asked frequently to politicians and others in Europe and here is what kind of relationship should the West want with the Soviet Union in 10 years. And to be honest with you. I've yet to hear a decent answer. We don't know what kind of relationship we want with the Soviet Union in 10 years more of the same. Maybe you dramatically different well how dramatically different what do we really want in our relationship with Soviet Union and part of that is relates to a larger question. I feel for us in our own country. And that is that is our how we see our role generally in global Affairs, and I don't think we And that too well either and I think both the provide hope the presidential candidates in both parties will begin to address that more that the world is different than it was in the 60s and 70s and America's role in the world is different and some of the problems which confront us are different and there and we've got to start really a national debate on this whole cluster of issues of which the issue of the Soviet Union obviously is one big part since that is our primary adversary. Could I ask the other side of that question? Is there any evidence that the Soviets have consulted with the Warsaw Pact nations with respect to These Arms reduction agreements. And is there any evidence as to whether this is going to strengthen or weaken that Alliance? Yeah, it's actually yes. There's a very rarely ask question. It's a very good one. There has been a noticeable change under Gorbachev of consultation with his allies. Now, that's not to say that in the end. When the Soviet Union wants something in the Warsaw Treaty Organization that they don't get it. Although a lot of our West European allies will say the same thing about us in NATO that if the United States really wants a policy we're going to get it INF is an example whether or not the Allies like it or not, but the difference is and you pinpoint a very important point that it has it has really heightened the the the sense of loyalty and commitment by the military in the East European countries to to the Soviet Union in a positive way for the Soviet Union because they have been consulted on these things. And in fact, the the many people many specialists who have studied this attribute what Of the factors for the Soviets delinking for Gorbachev delinking INF from SDI in the rest was pressured by the East European allies who were putting enormous pressure and it was there's very good evidence of that enormous pressure on the Soviet Union to delink that issue to have the INF agreement without without SDI. And that was largely for their internal public problems know there is a public opinion in the socialist countries to it doesn't Express itself very very much countries like Poland. Now, I public opinion polls and they by the way, they print things quietly critical of the government. I saw one pole and I was over there this summer which showed the 77% of the people oppose the government's pilot recent policy on one issue and it was printed in the government newspaper. Now, that's fairly new. The czechoslovakians told me they have poles to but they just don't release them. I suppose, you know, that's that's safer. You've discussed this to some extent but to what extent do you think the present Administration is willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union and their allies on some of these issues you meant mentioned. I guess. It depends on which part of the administration it's my understanding that mr. Weinberger is not too interested and in this line. Mr. Verdi who understand why it will probably be confirmed this afternoon and the mr. Schultz and others obviously our have a very different View and I think we'll have a continuation of the divided Administration which we've had for seven years. The I think one can see if the INF agreement does go through and is ratified which I would think it will be after very difficult battle and if Gorbachev on November 7th does come through with some dramatic proposals, which most people expect that's the 70th anniversary of the of the Bolshevik Revolution and it's a very important day for the Soviet Union and Has what is being billed as the speech of speeches in his two and a half years coming out on November 7th. Now everyone's anxious to know what's going to be in the speech of speeches. Obviously, it's again determined primarily for his own audience. But obviously, they'll be clear messages for us to and and people expect they'll be some bold proposals in that as well. We have time for just one more question John. Do you think any of our presidential you talked about Reagan's Reese our president ministrations response? Do you think any of our presidential candidates will adopt a more receptive response to Gorbachev suggestions? And if so, who? You know glass nose goes just so far enough. I really can't answer that one because and they'll I'll bet you I'll ask is anyone in this room willing to come up here and do that? I don't know. Maybe you are maybe you are I really don't think that's the way to answer that as far as the the earlier point that I cut off my speech part way through on what the United States should do. I think part of that has come through in the question and answer and the rest of it will be reported very widely and papers here and throughout the country starting tomorrow, and we again, thank you and we encourage you to tune into Minnesota Public Radio for the conference starting tonight. Thanks very much. Thank you very much. Mr. Monroe's for what has been a provocative and yet at the same time. I think a very hopeful discussion. I have a gift to present to you. It's something we do at the conclusion of these Minnesota meetings. It strikes me as being a particularly appropriate gift to give to you given your remarks. I want to present you with Minnesota meeting peace pipe created by Minnesota artist Robert Rose bear and this peace pipe is symbolic and Indian lore of the human bonds, which must be maintained by us in order to live together peacefully, and if you'll come up I'll give it to you and with that. Thank you all for coming today and those of you who are listening to us, and we hope that you'll plan to attend Senator Lugar speech here, October 26th.