Minnesota Meeting: Max Kampelman - Negotiating in a Nuclear Age

Programs | Midday | Topics | Politics | Types | Speeches | Grants | Legacy Amendment Digitization (2018-2019) | Social Issue | Minnesota Meeting |
Listen: 29020.wav
0:00

Max Kampelman, the head of the United States delegation to the current negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva, speaking at Minnesota Meeting. Kampelman’s address was on the topic "Negotiating in a Nuclear Age." After speech, Kampelman answered audience questions, including one on Chernobyl disaster aftermath. Minnesota Meeting is a non-profit corporation which hosts a wide range of public speakers. It is managed by the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.

Read the Text Transcription of the Audio.

Max kampelman was educated as a lawyer. With a doctorate from New York University and as a political scientist with a doctorate from the University of Minnesota. He was legislative Council to Hubert Humphrey for six years before he joined the Washington law firm and remained a lifelong Humphrey advisor and confidant. He's been active in good works and policy politics to various to mention here. He is I believe the model of the reflective practitioner the person who not only brings people together to get something done, but also thinks hard about what it's worthwhile to do together. Our speaker was appointed by President Carter to head the delegation to the Madrid conference to review progress in carrying out the 35 Nation Helsinki agreement on European security cultural exchange and human rights. when Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in the White House Max kampelman was asked to continue and to complete that negotiation which he did with skill mixed with determination. And now President Reagan is ask Max compliment to head up the critical Arms Control talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva indeed the very first I'm in a position to announce the very first agreement that he and his opposite number Victor carp off of made which was to take part of this week off for four activities in the Soviet Union and in Minnesota. Max kampelman is a negotiators negotiator faced now with the most fateful negotiation of his illustrious career. When we consulted Minnesota citizens in 1984 about the prospects for nuclear peacemaking, we found them asking questions. So fundamental that the arms control experts weren't even addressing them on us Soviet relations. For example, they were asking what's the minimum Behavior we need out of the Soviets and what's the minimum Behavior? They need out of us to persuade us mutually not to blow up the world. Max councilman's instructions from his government sound more complicated than that, but he's trying in Geneva to negotiate an answer to that basic question. In a ceremony at the Humphrey in at the Humphrey Center this afternoon, we will honor him for his Valiant efforts as the first recipient of the Hubert Humphrey award for distinguished public leadership. Thank you very much Harlan. Muriel Max Governor's ambassadors, and I know there are in the audience here. Mr. Vice president. distinguish guest so many friends in the audience before I share with you some of the thoughts that I have on the subject designed to me. I want to use this occasion. to say to this Minnesota audience That it can be proud very proud. of Walter Mondale his dedication to public service. And the depth of his patriotic commitment to our national values. And I think the American people must insist that his experience his commitments his leadership not be lost to us and to our country in the years ahead. And I'm proud I'm very proud of our friendship and love. the respect that I hold for him It's of course a pleasure for me to return to, Minnesota. And to which university? The memories of my days here are dear. It was here that the opportunities for a full life opened their doors to me. It was here that I learned the importance of physical and mental discipline. It was here that I became nourished in the Vitality of democratic government. It was here as iron to graduate degrees that I discovered the richness and the beauty of teaching and it was here that I met my most cherished friend and teacher Hubert Humphrey. On October 20 1983 at the groundbreaking for the building on campus that carries his name. I spoke on Hubert H Humphrey a realist in pursuit of ideals. It is a Pursuit which continues for those of us who were inspired by his life and his commitments. It is a subject. I wish to explore with you further today as we dedicate this building with special attention to the world in which we live. There is a 19th century Yiddish tale of a man who went to the tailor in his small village on ordered a pair of trousers for himself. He was measured. He returned a week later and learned that the pants were not ready. He returned the next week and they were not ready. He returned the third week and the same story. There was growing exasperation and a repeat during the fourth and fifth weeks and finally after six weeks the pants were ready. The customer irritated but now philosophical turn to the tailor and said listen it took God only six days to make the whole world. Why did it take you six weeks to make just this one pair of pants. The tailor patiently took his customer to the window of his shop pointed outside and explained. Yes, but look at that world and then look at this fine pair of pants. As you and I look at this world, it falls seriously short of our hopes. In my younger years one world was our expectation and we thought it to be a realistic expectation. It was required. We thought by technology and the communications Revolution. We had learned as a nation. It was said of our error in not joining the League of Nations. We therefore helped create the United Nations, which would bring us to a world community in. Peace. Yet today there is no world Community the people of Switzerland and a recent referendum overwhelmingly said they would not join the United Nations. Many others Even in our own country if given the choice would say stop the world. I want to get off. There seemed to be disappointingly fewer values universally shared by all governments. From the beginning the United Nations included states that rejected the humanitarian values that permeated the charter of the United Nations. The United Nations as Jean Kirkpatrick has pointed out cannot preserve values not shared and supported by a vast number of its member states. Hijackers and terrorists and those who support them challenge conceptions of a natural Harmony of Interest among governments yet. The United Nations has been unable to agree on any effective language or even definition to deal with the problem. These are dangerous times. They will require our Inner Strength understanding and faith and most important they will require the energy and the intelligence of the student generation now coming into its own. each generation faces its own unique challenges but Through the Ages they appear to have one common characteristic men and women seem capable of mobilizing their talents to unravel the mysteries of their physical environment. We have learned to fly through space like birds and move in deep Waters like fish. But how to live and love on this small planet as brothers and sisters still eludes us. In every age that has been the essence of the challenge it remains so today. The immense challenge of our age the nuclear age is to find the basis for lasting peace among the peoples of the world so that they might live in dignity. You've heard that I've had the privilege since 1980 of heading to separate American delegations in international negotiations under two presidents. The task common to each was to negotiate with the Soviet Union. In 1980. I was asked by vice president Mondale at the request of the President Carter to represent the United States. At a 35 Nation meeting in Madrid which lasted for three years. It's a gender was governed by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and agreement whose justifying principle was that they ton't would be the premise of East-West relations. But they taunt turned out to be an illusion Soviet repression of Human Rights was and is taking place on a massive scale. Political and religious dissidents were and are imprisoned often in slave labor camps and psychiatric hospitals. Government-sponsored anti-Semitism was and is highly evident emigration promised under the Helsinki agreement declined to its lowest levels. A hundred and twenty thousand Soviet troops continue to brutalize Afghanistan and its people and Soviet support and training of terrorists conspicuously continues unabated. And 16 months ago President Reagan asked me to head up the United States arms reduction negotiating effort in Geneva here as in Madrid. Our nation is attempting to find out a way of coping with a negotiating partner selective as to which part of its International commitments it wishes to respect. A tail here comes to mind of the lion the eagle the bull and the bear who came to a meeting to discuss disarmament. The lion looking at the bull proposed the abolition of horns the bull looking at the Eagle urge that Wings be abolished the eagle examining the Lions Anatomy called for the universal removal of claws. the bear listening to all of these proposals Took a more conceptual View. Let us abolish all those things that represent the militarization of our society and let us instead have one big Global hug he urged. A former ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bolden used to say that there were two classes of people he knew were lying people who said whiskey didn't affect them and those who claim they knew how to negotiate with the Russians. Some writers tell us that the Russians are inscrutable orientals products of a mysterious culture. We can never hope to understand others refer to the root cunning of Russian peasants as explanation for their governments Behavior still others portray, the Russians as innocent unsophisticated peasants suspicious of foreigners whose land has been overrun in the course of history by bloodthirsty Invaders the Swedish Economist Gunnar myrdal predicted that the West would make a mess out of its diplomacy with the Russians because we would assume they are gentlemen and make agreements. They had no intention of carrying out. My colleagues Paul nitze and Eugene rostow referred to the expertise of Sir William hater who once served as British ambassador to Moscow. So William remarked that negotiating with the Soviet Union was like dealing with a recalcitrant vending machine. Sometimes it helps to put in another coin. Occasionally it is useful to check the machine or even to kick it hard. But the one procedure which never seem to do any good. He said was to talk to it. The fact of the matter is of course that all and none of the above are true. The Russian culture is a strong and distinct one and we should do our best to understand it. The Russian people are a gifted people who have made an extraordinarily Rich contribution to literature art music and learning. The Russian Community is historically a deeply moral and religious one. The old-fashioned Russian thinkers did not suffer from inferiority complexes and neither does the modern Soviet. Furthermore the Soviet Diplomat is a highly intelligent and well trained professional. The issue in the Forefront of the international crisis is not the character and culture of the Russian people or of the other people who have been forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Empire. Government policy is made by governments and that of the Soviet Union is a dictatorship controlled by the Communist party with conspiratorial anti-democratic roots and experiences. It has survived longer than its neighbors anticipated. And it continues apparently to be bolstered by a marxist-leninist faith, which takes comfort in the historic inevitability of its Destiny and inevitability which justifies violence as necessary to hurry history along. The Soviet Union is today a massive military power. It is aggressive and repressive its objectives are clearly in conflict with Western political objectives. The word conflict is furthermore the essential reality of Soviet ideology our task especially in this nuclear age is to understand and somehow to persuade those who govern the Soviet Union that conflict cannot be permitted to extend itself into violence lawlessness terrorism and aggression our survival as a civilization depends on that Mutual understanding Where the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States are identical or close to being identical it is not difficult to reach an agreement thus it's not difficult to sell grain to the Soviet Union when it wants to buy Grain. The none pleura. Thracian Treaty of 1967 was quickly arrived at because both of us have the same interest in keeping the nuclear Club small. But we're profound policy differences are at issue. The essence of the conflict comes to the fore. Lenin believe the interests to be irreconcilable and this leninist theme was repeated in the recent 27th Soviet party Congress here. I believe is the Crux of the problem particularly given the legitimacy of violence under leninism. The tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union not described by many as great power rivalry somewhat like the Rivalry of to heavyweight prizefighters in the ring such a view is seriously misleading because it treats the interests and objectives of the two countries as equally legitimate the arsonist and the firefighter are not on the same moral political and legal plane. There is a life-and-death distinction between Western humanitarian values, which leninists would destroy as Bourgeois and the totalitarian do you mean izing values that characterize the Soviet system moral neutrality can be the enemy of moral and human values our country has a meaning and a purpose which we are determined to preserve. With a continued exhaustion of Europe from two World Wars. The United States is the One Nation on which the preservation of Liberty depends only the United States today stands as a counterforce to Soviet military power. There are some who respond to the danger to us represented by Soviet military power and theology By ignoring or rationalizing its existence that would be dangerous for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in our military power and its use alone. Indispensable as military strength is to us that view carries with it the seeds of tragedy as well. We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish the Soviet Union away. It is here and it is militarily powerful. We share the same Globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity. The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called a Great Awakening or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus yet the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist through the deterrence that comes from credible military strength through dialogue through criticism through negotiation coupled with political will National cohesiveness and self-confidence to persist in the search for understanding agreement. Peace. To negotiate is risky. It is in the words of Hubert Humphrey something like crossing a river by walking on slippery rocks. The possibility of disaster is on every side, but it is the only way to get across. Our country must be guided as a nation by what John Adams wrote in 1809. If I had refused to Institute a negotiation or had not persevered in it, I should have been degraded in my own estimation as a man of Honor. He said today to the object of diplomacy in a Democratic Society indeed. The Supreme achievement of statesmanship is patiently through negotiation to pursue the peace we seek at the same time as we protect our Vital national interests and values. We Trust our negotiating efforts will produce results and we are working for results By the nature and complexity of the issues we Face. However, we must also appreciate that even with agreement in Geneva. We will still be nearer to the beginning than to the end of our Pursuit. Our effort must be to persuade those who today lead the Soviet Union that just as the two sides of the human brain the right and the left adjust their individual roles within the body to make a coordinated and functioning whole so must hemispheres of the body politic north and south east and west right and left learn to harmonize their contributions to a whole that is healthy and constructive and coordinated in the search for peace with Liberty. We hope the leadership of the Soviet Union will come to accept that is in its best interest to permit a humanizing process to take place within its Society. We hope the time will come when Soviet authorities comprehend that repressive Societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability or true security. We hope they will come to understand the need to show the rest of us that cruelty is not an indispensable part of their system. We hope they will come to realize that the leninist aim of achieving communism through violence is an anachronism in this nuclear age. We hope but we cannot trust. We can afford to Hope. We have the strength as a nation to include that hope as an ingredient of our policy even as we understand its limitations. Let us remember Hubert Humphreys words that a strong Nation can always afford to be considerate a strong people can always afford to seek peace. Only the weak are arrogant and petulant. We are a confident people and with good reason we are proud of our past and of our accomplishments we have learned that our values are an integral part of our material well-being and that these are an inspiration for others who seek Liberty and decency for themselves. We have every reason to be confident of our future. We know that our pioneering days are not over. Our inventors innovators and entrepreneurs are the 20th and 21st century symbols of our pioneering tradition. A few statistics from our recent economic recovery. Tell the story last year more than 660,000 new corporations were established in the United States. We have generated more than 9 million new jobs in the past five years in 1983 alone. We committed more than two point eight billion dollars in Venture Capital start-up costs more than six million American Homes now have personal computers and that number is dramatically increasing and is supplemented by an Untold number of computerized schools offices and factories. The strength of our values is supported by our military and our material strength and our material benefits become possible and real as a result of the human values that guide us as a people. These strengths are inseparable. They are also Inseparable for successful diplomacy. American foreign policy must have its roots in our values if we are to take to attain the extraordinary public support necessary in a democracy for foreign policy to be effective. Diplomacy today must include the deterrence of military power as one of its essential ingredients. if the possession of power furthermore is to be effective as a deterrent perhaps its most vital function in foreign policy there cannot be a renunciation of its use in the pursuit of our national interests and values. We are in fact in a period today in which this issue. The use of power May well be the ultimate determinant in whether we can achieve the peace with dignity that we seek. It is time for our genius as a people to rise to the challenge and to find a revitalized American consensus in support of our values and our national security. With human dignity as the lodestar of American policy. We must lift ourselves above the polarity and divisiveness that too frequently becomes characteristic of partisan politics. We need social cohesion in support of the defense of our values our security and those of our friends the primary task of leadership today is to rebuild the vital American political Center which James Madison argued for in The Federalist Papers and which has kept us United in the face of our adversaries. All of us and the American society we have created fall short of our aspirations. We grow by stretching to reach them. As we do so however, let us be reassured by the conviction that the future lies with freedom because there can be no lasting stability in societies that would deny. It only Freedom can release the constructive energies of men and women to work toward reaching, New Heights. a human being has the capacity to Aspire to achieve to dream and to do we seek these values for all human beings. These aspirations are consistent with the onward movement of History toward a higher form of civilization and it is Our obligation to pursue them. Thank you very much Ambassador compliment since this isn't the first time you've ever been a teacher just filled your own questions what he's really saying is make your own enemies. The lights are blinding me a bit, but I'll try to see people across mr. Kampelman. Nice to see you. But I hear you. Mr. Campbell man. First of all, I want to assure you that many of us in this audience. If not, most of us in this audience totally agree with what I perceive to be the implicit suggestion in your opening remarks namely that we would be much better off with Walter Mondale as president of these United States particularly in the area of Arms Control. On the subject of Arms Control I would like to ask the following question given the Reagan Administration strong opposition to a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing its opposition to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, its opposition to a mutual verifiable nuclear weapons freeze and its opposition to a ban on space and anti-satellite weapons. How is it possible? To achieve arms control and secondly why should any of us? Take the advantage of the administration as being serious and arms control and light of its opposition to these achievable arms control proposals. I think in all Candor. I must tell you that I share the administration's views with respect to those issues that you have raised. These are not simple issues that we Face. These are very complicated issues. It's interesting to me that this full agenda which you have described is of course in my view a public relations agenda and does not deal with the important issue of reducing significantly the arms that are now existing in the nuclear field. The issue of verification is a very important issue. The Press has reported. I think rather fully but I don't mind reminding you of the fact that the president is now written three separate Communications to the head of the Soviet Union suggesting ways of getting off the verification dime. There hasn't even been a response to a single one of those letters and I think I would have known if there had been a response. You talk about a ban on Space strike arms, which is another part of the Soviet proposal the primary emphasis that I give to these negotiations arises out of my responsibilities in the space and defense field that those negotiations. And I want to say to you that a ban on Space strike arms, which what the Soviets are asking for. Is totally unverifiable. Because it includes within it a ban on Research. If we attempted to agree if we agreed to ban research we are alone in all likelihood would be living up to it. If we didn't live up to it some scientists would leak the story to The Washington Post or the New York Times and so would become known. If a scientist were doing that kind of research in the Soviet Union, I assure you those leaks would not appear in Pravda and we would not know and yet that's the essence of Soviet objectives. The Soviet objective is to try to stop the research program. We are determined to continue that research program. We also know that the Soviets are engaging actively in that research program and began that research program before 1983 when President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is very important in this field. And as I have familiarized myself with it and worked at it. It's very important in this field to try to avoid the propaganda aspects of these negotiations, which is what we're trying to do. These are serious complex problems what we have important National Security interests involved and the Soviet Union fully appreciates those and I find at least a difference between what is publicly said and what is sometimes privately said in these negotiations. I'll only conclude by saying that I am convinced that the president and his administration are fully committed to try to achieve an arms control arms Reduction Program or I wouldn't be in it myself I have other things to do with my time than to waste it. We are determined to do what we can to produce mutually agreeable verifiable reductions in both the INF area and the start area which can be stabilizing. That's the goal that we should be fighting for. Not the headline seeking slogans that really are irrelevant to the main issue in my opinion. Are you saying that a Test Ban is irrelevant and every previous administration has supported it as vice president Mondale supported. Are you saying that a ban on Space weapons and anti-satellite weapons are irrelevant? I how do we stop the arm lock we can debate this if you wish. I've explained my position with respect to the issue of a ban on Space strike arms. I've explained to you. First of all, there is no and I didn't even mention this there's no agreeable definition as to what a space strike arm is it's interesting to me for me looking at space strike arms the greatest most dangerous space strike arm that exists is the ICBM. It's interesting. The Soviet proposal does not include a ban on that ICBM. The Soviets have the only operational ABM system in the world. This is because we chose not to have one. We have a right to one but they have it their definition of space strike arms excludes that ABM system so that if we agree to have a ban on Space strike arms would have absolutely no impact on that gal. I system which they have surrounding in protecting Moscow. We the slogan is all it is is a slogan and I am saying to you yes that it is a slogan and is not relevant to the issues. The issues have to be reductions. Now when you talk about the the tests, I've also tried to explain to you. We are trying to get off the dime on verification. You know President Kennedy had an experience. We agreed to a ban with the Soviets. And lived up to that band. And all of a sudden they broke out of that ban. And ran a series of 40 some odd tests that had obviously been preparing for and President. Kennedy said at the time that he thought neither, he nor any other American president would ever again Sign or agree to a Test Ban that could not be fully verifiable and I'm saying to you that talking about bands is propaganda without adequate verification and I would much rather be spending my time, which is what I am doing trying to get reductions in the nuclear arms. That's what's realistically sought for in a stable way. Mr. Capel Monday Spirit of the last Geneva Summit confirm the usefulness of the periodic dialogue between the Russian leadership and our president what has happened to the schedule meeting for this year in Washington. And do you think that there will be a meeting and then secondly, there are some preconditions that we like to see before such a meeting takes place. I'll give you a personal judgment that there will be a summit in Washington in 1986. I do not have any inside information about this and as of the time I last left Washington, we still had no evidence from the Soviets to that effect. But that is my opinion Gorbachev agreed in November last year in Geneva that he would come to Washington 1986. I don't think he will very easily break that agreement and he can do it any time till the end of December and still satisfy that agreement so that I do believe that there will be a summit in 1986. The United States has no preconditions for that Summit at all. I do not believe the Soviets have preconditions for it. In spite of the occasional statements that come out from their spokesman and in spite of the statements that say we need to show results IE. We have to have agreements ahead of time and maybe we will have and maybe we won't have I don't know it takes two to get agreements, but I we certainly have no preconditions and I doubt very much that the Soviets have have preconditions now, it's a brief history a formal invitation was rendered through Ambassador dobrynin for a summit take place in either mayor June. There's still has not been a formal answer to that which is in itself interesting. There was a response from the Soviet Ambassador somewhat along the following lines as I read the memorandum. It was an oral response. That said isn't May and June perhaps too early. And do you think we can get done? What has to be done in time Secretary Shultz said we do not think May and June is too early. We have a momentum that's flowing from the summit. Let's not late too much time go by. Let's see if we can capture some more of that momentum and we think that we could make a great effort stimulated by that date to come to agreements if they are in the cards. We have heard nothing more. Obviously a preliminary to such a summit would be a meeting of the foreign ministers shiver Nazi and Schultz. I can tell you and it's a fact that an invitation was rendered to share her Nazi to come to Washington, which is where the next meeting was supposed to be last January. It was not responded to when the invitation was explored further. The answer was that he had a travel schedule in Asia, which he did. He went to Asia. And as it got into February that he had to be he was very busy with the 27th party Congress, which is going to start at the end of February, so he didn't come in January. He didn't come in February. Finally last in April and there were no responses to any of the requests finally in April. When do Brennan came to Washington in early April? To say goodbye. He came with some messages and an agreement was made then to have a meeting of the foreign ministers on May 6th. As you know, as a result. They said of our Libyan action that they canceled that meeting of May 6 have not re-established a date now what conclusions and I have to give you only personal conclusions about this. I do not believe the Soviet Union is yet ready for serious negotiations with the United States. This is a personal judgment by no means am I speaking for my government on this? I don't think they have their act together yet. And I think we have to be patient about that. There's a new leader. Whose primary occupation has been the domestic social and other problems that he's got he has had to do something about the leadership Factor. He's had drastic changes to make at all levels of the leadership. He did ask a new foreign minister to come in who had absolutely no experience in foreign policy. But who I am told is working day and night in order to familiarize himself with a lot of these problems and they do take a great deal of effort and time. Up until the last few weeks the same people in the foreign Ministry who were there under gromyko were there under Chevron Nazi and Gorbachev? They're still the same people. But there have been some shifts. They have not been shifts to the extent that I had anticipated the shifts and those shifts may still come. But they are still trying to get their act together. Mr. De Brennan has now been shifted there where he's got a very important Post in the Communist Party International department and where he is listed as a as a an advisor to Gorbachev the negative with respect to the stalling which I see as stalling as far as the Soviets are concerned my own personal view is that they just have not been ready for it. But I think they probably will be ready for it in time for a meeting in November. Go ahead, sir, okay. What do you say to the Europeans in terms of what you need from them to help fulfill your objectives our relationship with the Europeans is really relatively good. There's always a crisis during Fritz's days during predecessor days, you know, you're dealing with 16 sovereign states that a Democratic states and they've got their own domestic internal politics to worry about and I guess I've got to confess I once had an argument with my wife so, you know, it's not unusual for 16 states that have arguments one with another on occasion, but the relationship was fairly good I go to Nato twice every round once at the beginning and once at the end European foreign ministers are constantly coming to Geneva and other Arms Control experts we consult with them frequently. Now it's interesting. However the differences in perception taking place in Europe. And I'll say this as an aside we felt the need to respond to a Soviet initiative of January 15th and 16th Gorbachev made the initiative publicly. That's this year and the very next day at at my negotiating table the Soviets table that those ideas we felt the need to respond to them. They were not total initiatives at the Soviets presented, but they were mostly in the INF field the shorter-range missiles the ones that affect Europe now primarily at least in our negotiations. And obviously since Europe was involved in this because we're talking about where the Europeans are the victims. Let's say of an SS 20 strike. We consulted very actively with them. And at one point when the United States position was fairly well established and the president made his decision. He sent out Paul nitze to Europe and Ed rowney to Asia with a letter to the heads of government in which he said, I am planning to do the following in response to the Soviet proposal. I'd like your comments on it. However, I can only tell you that as a result of those visits he didn't go through with his plan. But we modified the INF proposals and interestingly enough. However, we modified it in a more Hardline approach than one would have thought that is the president's original position was in a sense if we can use terms like hard and soft which are over simplified wasn't a soft wasn't affect much softer than the Europeans wanted it to be. I mean we had the Asians for example saying to us, what do you mean? What about us we have these SS 20s hitting Asia. How can you have an agreement with the Soviets on Europe without taking care of our problem in Asia? We had a loop practically, although not all of the European countries saying to us. We're afraid here that will be left vulnerable and exposed the take care of our interest more and it was modified. So I would not now want to say that we need a b or c from the Allies. I think the process is a good one. It's one of exchange and discussion that I think it's moving in the proper direction. Carl are is there any indication that the chernoff ski disaster would have any impact on the foreign policy of the Soviet as regards their Eastern allies the Eastern Bloc or as regards their softening of attitudes in general at the bargaining table to negotiating table. Carl I have not seen any evidence of that in Geneva, but that does not mean that the subject is not being discussed in Moscow among decision makers or among those who are advising the decision makers. They may very well be talking about it from our point of view the Chernobyl disaster strengthened our views with respect to the need for verification. Which which is significant something. However that your question leads me to say is this. I don't know how many of you noticed that the Warsaw Pact at a meeting last week at the instigation of the Soviets adopted a resolution reaffirming their confidence in nuclear power. And adopting a program of increased production of nuclear power through putting up more nuclear plants. And that seems to be the direction in which they are moving. Now. My perception of the public reaction in the west is that these will be discouraged one or two governments in Europe have already either pulled back or slowed up plans. They had to develop nuclear power and the public reaction is one of concern about nuclear power. So I think we can guess and if we're going to judge that is going to be much less nuclear power developed in the west. So we may find ourselves in a situation down the road where the West becomes increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for energy. And that's a factor that I see down the road possibly here, which is a byproduct that you that may be a question Ambassador kampelman in your remarks you stated made reference to moral Integrity of the United States to meaning and value in our approach and you made a reference to a firefighter and an arsonist would our negotiating position with the Soviets be hampered if we did not go into it with a strong feeling of moral superiority. I don't think so, but I really can't demonstrate that. I think that we have every right to be proud of our values and to be proud of our judgment which can recognize contrary values. This is really what our country is all about. It seems to me and it's what we ought to be proclaiming to the world. Not that you have to do much proclaiming to the world because the peoples of the world know this and I don't think we should be embarrassed about proclaiming those values. The Soviets the leadership aelita, certainly not embarrassed about proclaiming the virtues of their values. It's interesting that as I went through and I do not mean to indicate to you that I read every word of the five and a half hours statement of Gorbachev to the 27th party Congress, but I want you to know I went through it and it was interesting to me that the largest portion dealt with leninism and its virtues and its superiority. And I don't think we ought to kid ourselves into thinking that a serious negotiation such as an arms control negotiation, which involves the National Security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are very much affected by atmospherics. That's my view of it. nor do I think that it's affected by trying to to minimize the problems that exist between us I don't think a I don't really think it's appreciated by them, but it certainly is not effective. You've heard that I had three years experience negotiating with the Soviets in Madrid. We came up with an agreement. It's the only agreement that has taken place yet to under the Reagan Administration and I want to say to you to those who followed it carefully know that I was not a bit. Shy about calling a spade a spade as far as the Soviet Union was concerned and I think as a matter of fact because I know a number of universities and other places are using it. I think we built probably one of the most effective cases about the nature of the Soviet Union that's been built. And so I'm not prepared. We shouldn't be thinking serious problems are by serious people and Soviets serious are affected by these atmospherics. I'm afraid this is want to have one other question. Why do we get somebody else besides Adam? He's very good. He's also my neighbor. Go ahead Adam. I'm afraid this isn't even a question. It's a very brief statement. I was privy to The Test Ban negotiations during the last Administration and I have to say that towards the end of the administration. We had resolved the verification problems. There was no verification problem of any significance remaining and I also have to say that I believe that the reason this Administration has dropped. The Test Ban Treaty is that there is a large and indeed dominant factor in the administration, which doesn't want to stop producing weapons. This is why there's politics. This is why there is the most democratic system and I want you to know that a demure molinsky is outstanding public servants illustrious career in government. He has a right to be wrong, but but but so be it. Thank you all very much.

Funders

Digitization made possible by the State of Minnesota Legacy Amendment’s Arts and Cultural Heritage Fund, approved by voters in 2008.

This Story Appears in the Following Collections

Views and opinions expressed in the content do not represent the opinions of APMG. APMG is not responsible for objectionable content and language represented on the site. Please use the "Contact Us" button if you'd like to report a piece of content. Thank you.

Transcriptions provided are machine generated, and while APMG makes the best effort for accuracy, mistakes will happen. Please excuse these errors and use the "Contact Us" button if you'd like to report an error. Thank you.

< path d="M23.5-64c0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.2 -0.1 0.1-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1-0.1 0.3-0.1 0.4 -0.2 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0 0.4-0.1 0.5-0.1 0.2 0 0.4 0 0.6-0.1 0.2-0.1 0.1-0.3 0.3-0.5 0.1-0.1 0.3 0 0.4-0.1 0.2-0.1 0.3-0.3 0.4-0.5 0-0.1 0-0.1 0-0.2 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.1-0.3 0-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.2 0-0.1 0-0.2 0-0.3 0-0.2 0-0.4-0.1-0.5 -0.4-0.7-1.2-0.9-2-0.8 -0.2 0-0.3 0.1-0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.1-0.1 0.2-0.3 0.2 -0.1 0-0.2 0.1-0.2 0.2C23.5-64 23.5-64.1 23.5-64 23.5-64 23.5-64 23.5-64"/>