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JIMMY CARTER: After seeing this great audience and listening to the applause, I'm tempted to announce as a candidate for president again but--

[LAUGHTER, APPLAUSE]

But fortunately, I'm able to withstand that temptation.

[LAUGHTER]

No political figure, much less one who served as president of our great nation, could come to an institute named for Hubert Humphrey without some very serious and sobering thoughts about the past. Two names stand out in my mind, which I believe have transformed the consciousness of this nation during my lifetime. Neither one of them became president.

One was from Georgia. One was from Minnesota. Martin Luther King Jr. and Hubert Humphrey.

Ours is just a great nation and I'm going to say a few words about that before I answer questions. And no one could live in this country and see the heterogeneous nature of our population, how our country was formed, how decisions were made, how crises were faced, how the hopes, and ethics, and principles, and standards, and moral values of our country were shaped without appreciating in a special way a man like Hubert Humphrey. I first met him when he was vice president. I've never had the opportunity to meet a Democratic president.

He came to Atlanta after a long and arduous trip through Europe and he spoke at a friend's home. I was a candidate for governor and I went there to meet this great man. And I don't know how tired he was, but he stayed long enough to answer the eager questions about the shape of international affairs.

Later, I was elected governor and he came back to Atlanta to spend the night with me at the governor's mansion. Rosalynn and I often remember his sitting at a small table trying to speak to me about matters of importance, not excluding the 1972 campaign for president with Amy in his lap and brownie all over his face from Amy's eager hands. He never flinched. He never acted as though Amy was a burden to him or that she was messing up his white shirt with dark brown stain of brownies. It was a natural response of him to a little friendly child.

And then I became president. And during the first year of my term, Hubert Humphrey was my mentor. He helped me in times of serious need. He supported my policies. He gave me advice and counsel.

Through Fritz Mondale, he was a constant voice within the inner circles of the White House. And then he became seriously ill as you remember. And on one of my return trips from the West Coast, I came by this community to pick him up. We all knew that he didn't have long to live. And he and his family and some of his most intimate friends were at the airport to see him off on what might turn out to be his last official visit back to Washington.

And as Air Force One took off from the Twin Cities airport and I thought about the warmth and the love in the eyes and hearts of those around him, I didn't feel sorry for him. I felt that's a lucky man. And Hubert Humphrey was indeed a lucky man.

He felt that although our nation was great, it could be greater. And in my opening remarks this afternoon, I'd like to take just a few minutes to try to precipitate some questions from you. And then we'll devote the major portion of our time together with questions and answers.

I also had the responsibility, as a candidate and later as a president, to decide in my own mind what is it that makes a nation great. Obviously, a country like the United States must be able to defend itself from any possible military adversary. And we need not fear that.

We are the most powerful nation on Earth, not only politically and economically but also militarily. Anyone who states that we are inferior to another country, any other country in military terms is deliberately misleading the American people. It's a dangerous thing to do.

[APPLAUSE]

But the great men of our country have never considered military strength to be a unique measurement of the greatness of a nation. I'll be very brief, but I think one measure of a great nation is its search for peace. Not just peace between ourselves and our potential adversaries, but peace to be established in the troubled spots on Earth where people are filled with hatred and despair, where bloodshed prevails, and where most often there's a searching eye turn toward, the United States of America, toward Washington, toward the White House.

I believe a great nation ought to try to inject itself rarely into the internal affairs of another country only when our security is directly threatened. We should be very restrained in trying to force American ideas on others. But when they turn to us searching for peace, we should be ready there.

In the Middle East, this has been and still is the case. In Central America, the people prefer an end to bloodshed. And our country, in all its ways, should exemplify a peaceful presence, letting its great influence and strength be adequate, not to inject American troops into those trouble spots which quite often exacerbates and damages the prospects for peace and an end to bloodshed.

[APPLAUSE]

Another major goal to which Senator Humphrey devoted a large part of his effort is also a measure of greatness for our country. If you ask almost anyone, what is the greatest threat to the future, the most profound threat to the future, most people would say, the nuclear arsenals that exist in at least five nations on Earth. And I think a measure of the greatness of one of the superpowers is how avidly are we searching for a reduction in those nuclear arsenals with the ultimate goal, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.

[APPLAUSE]

About a year ago, I was in Ann Arbor with President Ford at his library. And we had a large number-- we had a large number of news people and an almost unique press conference because two presidents were there. And President Ford and I commented that we never saw an anti-nuclear demonstrator when we were in office, either in this country or in any nation in Europe.

And news people began to join the conversation. They never recalled an anti-nuclear demonstrator while he, or I, or President Nixon were in office because our country was known at that time as being in the forefront of the search for the reduction in nuclear arsenals. And any obstacle that existed was identifiable in the minds of our people and those in Europe as in Moscow or the Kremlin.

I'm ashamed to say that that's no longer the case. And now we have, for the first time since the days of President Eisenhower, no ongoing or planned negotiations to bring about a reduction in nuclear arsenals. So that's the second thing I would say as a measurement of greatness of our country.

The third, I think, would be in environmental quality. Not just air pollution and water pollution but a quality of life and not just for our own people, for people throughout the world. A determination by the world's greatest power that the quality of life for children and grandchildren to come after our generation will be even better than the one we inherited.

This is such a broad and complicated subject that was described in the Global 2000 report prepared when I was president, that it's a direct responsibility for the leaders of our nation and other nations in government, business, commerce, trade, the professions to assess what's going to happen to us by the end of this century unless something is done about the rapid explosion in population, the depletion of arable land, the destruction of rainforests, the pollution of the oceans, and a change in employment habits that affect the societal structure that gives us a chance for food, and educated minds, and healthy bodies, and adequate shelter, and a sense of common purpose.

And the last point that I'll mention in the measurement of a nation's greatness would come under the broad term of human rights. If there was one startling advocate for human rights at home in the early stages of the civil rights movement, it was obviously Hubert Humphrey, who brought the nation to its feet in a startling address to the Democratic Convention when he was a spokesman there. And he and Martin Luther King Jr. and a few others had the courage, and the foresight, and also the temperament and the ideals to bring about this profound transformation in our country.

And to me, we should be the champion of human rights abroad and civil rights at home under every conceivable circumstance. This means the caring for those who are weak, and inarticulate, and unorganized, and poor, and deprived, and suffering, and persecuted. Unto the least of these among us, the powerful have a responsibility to minister. And to me, that's also a measure of a nation's greatness.

Well, we now face wonderful opportunities in our country. We face, as almost always, serious problems at home and abroad. But if we can remember those elements of national greatness, which guided the life of Hubert Humphrey and through him guided the life of many others, including me, there's no question in my mind that our nation can fulfill the hopes, and dreams, and ambitions of almost 250 million people who live here and many other tens of millions throughout the world who still look to us for guidance, and protection, and inspiration.

As people under God living free, confident, but not proud to the exclusion of others understanding one another, reaching out a hand of friendship and compassion, understanding, and mutual purpose, these are the things, in my judgment, that guided Hubert Humphrey's life, which make me proud to be here and which can be a very sure and inspiring guide for the people of our nation. Thank you very much. Now, I'm eager to answer your questions.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: Mr. President the human computer that we have down there in the form of the young Republicans and the young Democrats has sorted these. And we start out with two related questions-- your reaction to the Kissinger commission report on Central America, and do you regret giving military aid to El Salvador?

JIMMY CARTER: One of the worst mistakes that our nation makes and has made in the past is to inject itself into the internal affairs of other countries.

[APPLAUSE]

Unless it's tangibly obvious that our own security is directly at stake, when we go into a nation like Vietnam, or like Lebanon, or like El Salvador, and put our arms around someone in a position of leadership and say, this is our boy, it almost immediately puts the political kiss of death on that person.

[LAUGHTER]

Because even though they may have been quite popular with their own supporters and others, they immediately become suspect as tools of the CIA or as puppets of the United States of America. We saw that happen to the Vietnamese leaders. And we saw that happen recently to Amin Gemayel . And we're now seeing that happen in El Salvador.

I don't think we ought to give El Salvador any military aid unless they do comply with rigid standards of human rights compliance.

[APPLAUSE]

I think our message to the Salvadoran leaders has been, in the last three years, equivocal at best. We insisted before the El Salvadorans got any military aid that they had to comply with certain basic standards. One was land reform. The second was free and open and democratic elections. A third was the termination of the death squads which still are killing with partial government sponsorship 200 or 300 innocent people every month.

And we also insisted that the murderers of the four American nuns be arrested, tried in a fair trial, and convicted if guilty. These were the standards that we prescribed for El Salvador. As soon as I went out of office, unfortunately, these standards were abandoned. And I think it's worked to the disadvantage not only of the United States' presence in Central America, but also our reputation as a protector of human rights. And it's also worked to the disadvantage of those in El Salvador whom we profess to be aiding with economic and military aid.

I might add as a quick postscript that there should be some distinction between military aid on the one hand and economic aid on the other. Because it's not right to additionally punish starving people just because their leaders are persecuting those same poor and starving people. So economic aid, OK; military aid and violation of human rights, absolutely not.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: Mr. President the next question hooks right on to your last sentence. Do you feel your insistence on making human rights an overt part of the diplomatic agenda helped or hurt our international relations while you were president?

JIMMY CARTER: As a totally unbiased and subjective-- and objective--

[LAUGHTER]

--observer, I would say there's no doubt in my mind that it helped. If I made one mistake on human rights while I was president, it was not an over insistence on it. It was not emphasizing it enough.

In my judgment, there is only one potential international champion of human rights and that's the United States of America. If we default on that responsibility, there is no other entity on Earth that can substitute for it. And among those who were able to come out of the Soviet Union, increasing from a few thousand in 1976 to over 50,000 in 1979, among the thousands that were liberated from the Cuban prisons, among those-- the disappeared ones, desaparecidos in Argentina who were released from prison, including the president and Jacobo Timerman who is quite famous, they were released as a direct result of our nation's insistence that other countries should comply with basic human rights standards or have their relationship with the United States, very precious to them, endangered.

Even among our own friends and trading partners like the Philippines and South Korea, our constant effort there was to induce those leaders to comply with human rights standards. And as you may or may not know, I designated Fritz Mondale to go to the Philippines. And one of his intense subjects of discussion with President Marcos was the release of Aquino who was recently assassinated when he went back to the Philippines. But he was permitted to come to our country because of our intercession. So on individual cases, we were quite committed to that process.

A very fine man named Kim Dae-jung in the latter part of 1980, September and October, was sentenced to death there. And I sent not only a top representative of the State Department but also one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet with President Chun. And I told him, if Kim Dae-jung is executed, this will be a serious blow to US-Korean relations. And Kim Dae-jung was released from prison and came to our country.

But I believe that our nation should always put forward a foreign policy based upon moral and ethical values and based upon our belief in democracy, freedom under the broad aura of human rights. I don't believe it weakens our country. Because the driving force-- the driving force among the vast majority of people on this Earth is to achieve a greater element of freedom in their own lives from hunger, starvation, deprivation, isolation, imposed silence, imprisonment without conviction, torture, and murder by their own government. If our nation can't be against these things, then what do we stand for? I think we ought to be against them.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: This is a very topical question indeed. Do you support the school prayer amendment?

JIMMY CARTER: No.

[APPLAUSE]

First of all, I don't think of the United States should be tampered with lightly or for political purposes during a campaign year. Secondly, the present Supreme Court ruling does indeed permit individual worship on school campuses by students who choose to do so. And third, as a Baptist who believes in the separation of church and state, I don't believe that teachers ought to have the right in a public school system to either require students to worship or to embarrass a student who chooses not to worship.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: If a situation like the Tehran hostage affair occurred again, what would you do different?

[LAUGHTER]

JIMMY CARTER: In one of the most interesting and, I think, agonizing chapters in the book that I wrote after I left the White House, the book called Keeping Faith published by Bantam still on sale--

[LAUGHTER]

--by the way, I described that very trying year, not just difficult for me as president but difficult for our nation. I've seen and read a lot of postmortem analyses of what might have been done. I honestly cannot think of anything differently that I could have done. From the very beginning, we expected the hostages to be released at any moment or the next week and so forth. We never anticipated their staying for 14 months held as kidnapped prisoners with the support of the existing government of Iran.

I had two major responsibilities in my own mind. I didn't find them-- I did not find them to be in conflict. One was to protect the interest and integrity of my own country. And second was to preserve the lives of all hostages and to bring them home ultimately to freedom. In the long run, I believe that we did accomplish both commitments. Our nation's integrity and reputation was protected, its interests were protected, and every single hostage came home safe and free.

[APPLAUSE]

I would wish that they had come home the last week in October 1980.

[LAUGHTER]

But I was glad they came home as a result of our work before I went out of office so I'm grateful for that. I wouldn't change what I did even knowing now what I-- even knowing then what I know now.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: You've been quoted as saying that you put a lot of legislative work perhaps too much on Congress your first year. Do you want to comment on that?

JIMMY CARTER: Yes. I think that in a retrospective analysis of our administration, and particularly in the assessment of why we didn't get re-elected, the constant heavy agenda that we put on Congress was excessive. There were always a series of debates, and disappointments, and modifications, and amendments, and compromises highly publicized in the press. And without any present intention to derogate the press, I might emphasize that always the negative vote in the subcommittee made headlines. But a positive vote in the committee and in an ultimate passage of a legislation was hardly mentioned in the press.

So the impression given throughout the nation was that we had a very disruptive and unsuccessful relationship with the Congress. As a matter of fact, throughout the four years, in spite of the highly-controversial nature of some of our legislation, we had the same kind of batting average as did John Kennedy and as did Lyndon Johnson, about 70% favorable reaction by Congress. We never had a negative vote in Congress on any matter of importance that concerned defense of foreign policy. And we ultimately got major legislation passed on civil service reform, deregulation of the private enterprise system, Alaska Lands Bill energy legislation, and so forth, which were very controversial things.

The most difficult single issue, which I ever had to address in the political world, even more difficult than my becoming president at the beginning, was the Panama Canal treaties. This was a highly unpopular but necessary and worthwhile effort. When I became president, a Gallup poll showed that only 8% of the American people favored any change in the Panama Canal treaties. But both my predecessors and I, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, all felt that there should be some clarification of the Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone, but the right by our country to defend the operation of the canal and to have priority for our ships to pass through the canal in an emergency. This is what we ultimately consummated.

In my judgment, this is the most courageous single vote in the Congress in the 200 years or so of our history. For instance, of the 20 senators who voted for the Panama Canal treaties in 1978 who were up for re-election that year, only 7 of them came back to the Senate the following January. Two thirds of them did not come back, but I believe it was the right thing to do.

So we did give Congress a heavy load. We should have spaced those things out perhaps a little more in a leisurely fashion, but it wasn't my nature to do it. I had a list of priorities of domestic and foreign achievements that I thought we ought to have as goals and we pursued them all as rapidly as we possibly could. And we had a good batting average in the end, I think, for the benefit of our country.

SPEAKER: This is turning out to be a tour of the horizon. Do you feel that because of the US pullout in Lebanon, the government of Gemayel was weakened and now must go to Syria for stability?

JIMMY CARTER: I said earlier, just briefly, that our injection of troops into a foreign country damages severely our own reputation if we fail. It also damages those whom we are trying to help. In my judgment, we put troops in the midst of a civil war in an almost defenseless military position, an inadequate number to prevail in any show to show of force, and in effect weakened Gemayel and his respect among his fellow Lebanese. We also gave Gemayel a sense that he didn't have to negotiate with the other Christian groups, the Druze, and the Muslim groups, that he was under the protection of the United States and he could in effect ignore the demands, some of which were legitimate, of his fellow Lebanese to form a fairer government.

Now that we've withdrawn, my prediction is that Gemayel will survive as a president of Lebanon. My prediction is that the Maronite Christians or the Phalangists will retain the right to hold the office of president. One possible change in the Lebanese constitution or laws might be that the president be popularly elected rather than chosen by the parliament. So these kinds of adjustments will take place.

I think that not only was Gemayel damaged, but also the interest of the United States and Israel in the Middle East. And of course, Syria and its influence has been greatly strengthened. And my guess is now that there will be more peaceful interrelationship among Lebanese, an increase in militancy among the Lebanese who live in the southern part of their country against the Israelis who-- they are an occupying force, a lessening of US influence in the entire Middle East, no influence left in Lebanon, and an increase in the influence of Syria.

So obviously, this was not a good move for our country. There may be more stability in Lebanon. It will be under the general supervision or approval of Syria.

SPEAKER: What measures should be taken by the United States to end apartheid in South Africa?

[APPLAUSE]

JIMMY CARTER: This is always a difficult question to answer because many people who propose the question seem to think that our country has the right and also the power and authority to impose on South Africa our own standards or forms of government. We don't have that right. We don't have that strength. We don't have that authority.

[APPLAUSE]

And short of mounting an invasion force able to overcome all the opposition in South Africa, we can't prevail. However, that doesn't mean that we are without strength. One of the early things that I did was to send Fritz Mondale to meet with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. He publicly demanded to voice his great discomfiture, not only that apartheid be ended but that South Africa change its form of government to one man, one vote. I should say, to be more correct, one person, one vote.

[APPLAUSE]

We had a great deal of constant effort throughout Africa and the entire developing world with Andy Young being the highly identifiable spokesman for our country. And Andy went to South Africa several times and gave me and the members of our cabinet-- other members of our cabinet advice on how we should treat South Africa. We constantly pushed South Africa to ease its persecution of Blacks, to give them better opportunities in housing, education, and so forth. And we brought into the cabinet room the chief executive officers of 15 or so of the greatest corporations in our country who had investments in South Africa. And Andy Young, and Don McHenry, and others had prepared a list of standards for those American corporations to honor.

They involved equal employment opportunities, equal pay for equal work, the right to become foremen and to advance in the hierarchical structure of the corporations, a benevolent attention to the needs of the families of their workers both Black and white. These kinds of things were adopted by the American corporations to the benefit of the Blacks and other minority groups in South Africa. But as far as our thinking, that we can transform in a revolutionary way the government of South Africa, that's not feasible. And although I wish that we could see major changes away from apartheid, in my judgment, that consistent evolutionary pressure on South Africa is the best approach through the economic structure, through the political structure from one head of state to another to the United Nations, and also through public opinion aroused around the world.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: Once more back to the Middle East, what do you think of the future of peace and cooperation in that part of the world given the seeming stalemate of the follow up on the Camp David Accord?

JIMMY CARTER: One of my personal tasks now is to write a book about the Middle East and it's going to be a very brief book, about 120 pages. The first chapter will be a summary of the history that brought us up to this point. The last chapter will be my consensus and my recommendations on what ought to be done in the future.

And in between will be a presentation of the points of view that comprise the Mideast dispute, not only encompassing the several approaches within Israel itself all the way from the Peace Now movement to the right-wing commitment to annex all the occupied territories, but also the point of view or attitude of Syria. How does Assad look upon the Mideast question? How does King Hussein look upon the Mideast question? The same with Mubarak, president of Egypt, and Amin Gemayel and other groups in Lebanon, and the Palestinian community as well. Also a separate small chapter on European, American, and Soviet interests in the Mideast.

It'll be written in very simple language like peanut farmer language and will describe our hope to hundreds of thousands of readers. It will be a very cheap book. What are we doing and what can we do about the Middle East? Well, one basic premise is that there will be no progress in the Mideast without the dynamic, driving, committed influence-- some might use a word pressure-- from the United States of America.

Secondly, a designated ambassador is not an adequate voice. If it's a Robert Strauss, or a Sol Linowitz, or a Bud MacFarlane, or whoever, that's not adequate. It has to be at the level of the president himself or the secretary of state.

This has been the case in the past under presidents Ford and Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretaries of State Muskie, Vance, and under me. Only at the top level of American government will a Mubarak, or a Sadat, or a Begin, or a Shamir, or Hussein make a potential concession. They just won't do that with an ambassador no matter how qualified that person might be. That's the second premise.

The third premise is that we must be politically courageous. Fritz Mondale and I found this out in the political arena. And I need not beat around the bush with you, there is no way for you to talk about Palestinian rights nor withdrawal of military forces from the occupied areas in the West Bank and Gaza, or a direct negotiation between Israel and her neighbors and so forth without arousing intense political feelings. And the President of the United States has to be willing to take this potential political criticism in order to bring about this worthy goal of peace.

And the fourth thing I would say is that Sadat always had, in his private moments with me, an accurate assessment of the circumstances there. He said, the people want peace. In Egypt, in Israel, in Jordan, in Syria, in Lebanon, the people want peace.

The obstacles are the political leaders. The leaders have made, in order to become president or prime minister and so forth, they have made these ancient public vows or campaign promises, if you will-- I will never do this; may my right hand fall off if I ever do this-- based upon hatred in the midst of actual war. And they can't, without losing face, change their basic position or sometimes even their detailed positions without being able to blame it in effect on the United States. I didn't want to do this, but the president insisted that it was right. And in balance, what I've done is best for my country.

It's an extremely complicated subject. And I think not only does it cause divisions in our own country but even more intense divisions within Israel itself. The debate is becoming much more fervent there.

Are we going to withdraw from occupying troops from Lebanon? Is the goal of the Likud party to annex the West Bank and Gaza? Are the Palestinians are going to live in perpetuity under military domination as they have been now for going on 17 years? Are we going to take into Israel such a large number of Muslims, or Arabs, or non-Jews that it will change the character of our nation?

These are the kinds of questions that the Israelis are having to face. And they need the support, and guidance, and reassurance not only of their strength to survive but also to live at peace. And there needs to be a reaching out of hands and a willingness to negotiate. We can't expect Sadats to come along in the future. But the leadership can and I think must come from our own country.

In the last three years, it hasn't been there. Only one brief period when President Reagan made a very fine speech on the first day of September 1982 have we had any indication of that, but it wasn't followed up. And I don't want to see it become such an intense blood-shedding crisis that we're almost forced into taking negotiating action.

As a matter of fact, as a parenthetical end to my answer, nowhere now do we have negotiations in the troubled areas of international affairs. Iran-Iraq, Persian Gulf, Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza, Central America US-Soviet relationships, nuclear arms control, zero, no negotiations. And this is a departure from past American policy that's very deeply of concern to me.

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: Mr. President what do you think about the federal deficit and what should we do about it?

JIMMY CARTER: I'm very reluctant to say that I believe the deficit is too high. We've never experienced any such deficits as these, as you know. The previous highest deficit in history was in 1976, the last year that President Ford served as president. Fritz Mondale and I worked constantly to provide for the legitimate needs of our country and also to reduce the deficit working toward a balanced budget.

I was quite severely criticized by some members of my own party because of my so-called fiscal conservatism. But that's the way I was raised. That's the way I believe. And I think that the enormous deficits will damage our country severely in the future.

What's caused them? Two basic things. One is the unwarranted $750 billion reduction in taxes passed the first year President Reagan was in office primarily with benefits going to those with high incomes. This is over a five-year period.

It is a devastating blow to the income needed by our government to pay its legitimate bills and to meet the needs of our people. Secondly is the unwarranted expenditure on defense. Let me just give you an example of what I mean.

[APPLAUSE]

As some of you may know, my career was in the military. I was a graduate of Annapolis. I was in the Navy. I served in submarine forces.

And I was willing to give my life if necessary for the defense of our country and hope that my life was contributing to the peace of the world. So I'm not against a strong defense. As a matter of fact, each year that Fritz and I served in the White House, there was a steady, predictable, carefully planned increase in the defense expenditures. We worked it out with the Secretary of Defense and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was generally 3%, 4% above the inflation rate to correct some defects that had been left to us after eight years of steady decline in defense expenditure.

So I'm not against defense expenditures. But in this current year's proposal, the 1984 budget will mean that under President Reagan, in five years, defense expenditures have doubled. This year, we will spend more on defense then every nation in NATO combined, including Japan and including France. The defense budget this year means that every living American man, woman, and child will pay about $1,000. And the increase in defense expenditures in one year will be greater than the total defense expenditures of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan combined.

So this combination of enormous and unwarranted expenditures for the military, on the one hand, and the dramatic and unwarranted reduction in taxes for the very wealthy are a combination that has caused us now to look to the future to budget deficits on a sustained basis in the neighborhood of $200 billion. I might add another five-year period in saying that in five years under President Reagan's policy, our total national debt will double. In other words, he'll add more to the national debt than all the previous presidents in almost 200 years had accumulated. And we don't yet know what this means that the Republicans are praying that the adverse consequences of this will not be felt until after November of this year.

And this may be the case, but when you have a dollar available for investment now in new jobs, in homes, and technological improvements, and better quality of life, much more than half that dollar available through people's savings and so forth must go to finance a federal deficit. So this can't do anything other than hurt our country in the future. Other than that, I think the deficits are OK.

[LAUGHTER]

[APPLAUSE]

SPEAKER: One follow up on the defense budget. Both the Carter administration and the Reagan administration supported production of new, faster, and more accurate nuclear weapons-- MX Trident 2, Pershing II cruise missiles. Question, is there any difference between the nuclear weapons policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations?

JIMMY CARTER: Yes, there's a great difference. One of the prime purposes of my life was to continue the policies of my Democratic and Republican predecessors to negotiate with the Soviet Union more and more stringent controls on nuclear arsenals with reductions in the total number of warheads and missiles. Under presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and me, in my judgment, the Soviets negotiated in good faith.

When we knew we had the SALT II treaty in hand, I offered to President Brezhnev an agreement, just between the two of us binding on our nations, a total freeze on all development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Secondly, a 5% reduction annually, compounded annually for the length of the treaty, of the SALT II limits. Third, a total prohibition against the testing of all nuclear explosives peaceful or warlike in nature. And fourth, an immediate implementation of negotiations on SALT III, which would be much more drastic in reducing arsenals and also would include the intermediate-range missiles, which had not, until that time, been the subject of negotiations on anyone.

President Brezhnev rejected all these proposals and I was very disappointed that that happened. And the Soviets continued a crash program for the deployment of the very formidable SS-20 missiles. As a result of that, in December of 1979, the NATO allies agreed that if the Soviets did not negotiate in good faith and successfully to reduce their placement of SS-20s, that we would deploy the Pershings and the ground-launched cruise missiles. This is the way it was left when I went out of office.

President Reagan has personally opposed every single nuclear arms agreement ever reached. You may or may not remember, but President Reagan, in effect, had his eye on the White House for 16 or maybe 20 years since 1960 or 1964. And most of the time he was conducting his campaign, it was against not Democrats but against Republicans, Nelson Rockefeller, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford. And when they would complete negotiations on a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union, he immediately and publicly condemned it as a sellout to the Soviet Union. He characterized the SALT II treaty, immediately after it was signed and during the 1980 campaign, as being, quote, "fatally flawed."

This is part of his basic philosophy which concerns me. President Reagan has a genuine belief, in my judgment, first of all, that the Soviet people comprise an evil kingdom. And as he said to the evangelicals in Florida, Americans are the people of God. This firm belief on his part creates a great impediment to negotiation on any terms of equality to reach a mutual understanding.

The second thing he believes-- and he says this frequently, I'm not misquoting-- that the Soviets do not and never have negotiated in good faith. Third, that the Soviets will not honor nuclear agreements once made. So this means that our country and the Soviet Union, in the last two or three years, have made a repeated series of nuclear proposals, which have not had within them the possibility of acceptance by the other side, even after predictable kinds of negotiations.

The proposals both from Moscow and Washington have been designed primarily for propaganda purposes with the main target being the people of Europe and to a lesser degree, the freeze movement in this country. So I think there's been a change in policy concerning nuclear arms agreements and nuclear weaponry in the last three years, compared not only to my own term in office but to the service of my Republican and Democratic predecessors. Thank you very much.

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